Doctoral Dissertation in Law and Social Science: Attacking the Court: The Logic of An American Tradition

PI和C-PI：Gregory A.作者声明：Stephen M.恩格尔法学与社会科学博士论文：攻击法院：美国辩护的逻辑SES-0719031在过去的十年中，对联邦司法权力的修辞攻击有所增加。然而，尽管民选官员、利益集团领导人和学者谴责法院的不民主潜力，但这种高谈阔论并不新鲜。这些攻击在美国历史上时有发生;有些是夸夸其谈，有些是更可信的剥夺司法权力的威胁，还有一些则是通过结构性削弱联邦法院的措施。是什么造成了这种差异？为什么最近对联邦司法机构的攻击从来没有超越过言辞，而19世纪的案例的特点是通过措施从结构上削弱了最高法院？通过调查采取反法院行动的案件，即，剥夺管辖权，法院堆叠，司法弹劾等，以及反法院言论盛行但没有纪律处分的案件，我发展了一个理论来解释这种模式。而不是依赖于规范的司法至高无上的，因为目前的文献，我认为，修辞攻击没有后续通过是一个合理的战略，随着时间的推移，宪法外的机构，如政党，影响政治家如何看待宪法机构，如司法机构的变化。因此，利用"反多数主义困难"的幽灵攻击联邦司法机构的不民主潜力可能符合政治家的短期选举利益，但维持司法权力作为实现政策目标的有用武器也可能符合他们的长期利益。证据收集大N和案例研究分析。为了构建一个数据集时，反法院的行动被认为是，我评估国家党的平台和众议院和参议院的期刊。这些投票被用来测试反法院的言论和/或行动是否与国会中政党两极分化和凝聚力增强的时期相关。案例研究对五个反法院言论和行动的具体实例的描述和分析将依赖于平台、会议厅辩论以及通过档案研究收集的其他数据。对当代反司法情绪和行动的分析也将涉及采访民选和利益集团精英。反法院情绪是美国重要的政治传统。虽然这些言论经常出现，但政客们是否会在结构上削弱法院，在政治上是有条件的，因此，那些有利于攻击的条件可能会再次出现。因此，最近签署声明的增加，通过2006年《军事委员会法》暂停人身保护令，以及前共和党众议院通过剥夺下级联邦法院对堕胎、婚姻和宗教表达相关事项管辖权的措施，都提醒我们这一潜力。

PI and C-PI: Gregory A. Huber and Stephen M. EngelDoctoral Dissertation in Law and Social Science: Attacking the Court: The Logic of An American TraditionSES - 0719031 Over the last decade, rhetorical attacks on federal judicial power have increased. Yet, while elected officials, interest groups leaders, and academics decry the undemocratic potential of the courts, such speechifying is hardly new. These attacks have occurred throughout American history; some amount to rhetorical bluster, others more credible threats to strip judicial power, and still others are characterized by the passage of measures that structurally weaken the federal courts. What accounts for this variation? Why do more recent attacks on the federal judiciary never rise above rhetoric whereas nineteenth-century instances are characterized by measures passed to structurally weaken the Court? By investigating cases where anti-Court actions are taken, i.e., jurisdiction stripping, court-stacking, judicial impeachment, etc., as well as cases where anti-Court rhetoric is prevalent yet no disciplinary action follows, I develop a theory explaining this pattern. Rather than rely on norms of judicial supremacy as much of the current literature does, I contend that rhetorical attack without follow-through is a rational strategy contingent on changes over time to extra-constitutional institutions, such as parties, that influence how politicians view constitutional institutions, such as the judiciary. Thus, while it may be in politicians' short-term electoral interest to attack the undemocratic potential of the federal judiciary, exploiting the specter of a "countermajoritarian difficulty", it may also be in their long-term interest to maintain judicial power as a useful weapon to implement policy aims. Evidence is gathered from large-N and case study analysis. To construct a dataset of when anti-Court action was considered, I evaluate national party platforms and House and Senate Journals. These sweeps are used to test whether anti-Court rhetoric and/or action is correlated with periods of heightened party polarization and cohesion in Congress. Case study description and analysis of five particular instances of anti-Court rhetoric and action will rely on the platforms, chamber floor debates as well as other data collected through archival research. Analysis of the contemporary instance of anti-judicial sentiment and action will also involve interviewing elected and interest group elites. Anti-Court sentiment is an important American political tradition. While the rhetoric recurs regularly, whether politicians will weaken the Court structurally is politically contingent, and those conditions conducive to attack beyond rhetoric could therefore return. Thus, the recent increase in signing statements, the suspension of habeas corpus through the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and the former Republican House's passage of measures to strip jurisdiction in matters related to abortion, marriage, and religious expression from lower federal courts remind us of that potential.