Intensity Bias in Temporal Emotional Comparisons

随着时间的推移，人们如何对不同情绪的强度做出判断和决定？例如，随着时间的推移，人们如何决定分配资源，以减轻他们了解到的不同的可怕风险？他们是否会花更多的精力去预防那些他们最近经历过强烈情绪的坏事，而不是那些更有可能发生但他们最近没有经历过强烈情绪的坏事？同样，他们如何决定在不同的人道主义需求中分配慈善资金？他们是否会对最近而不是前段时间让他们苦恼的原因付出更多？这项研究将扩展初步研究，证明人们在进行这种短暂的情感比较时表现出强度偏见，在其他条件相同的情况下，判断当前的情绪比之前的情绪更强烈。九项研究将检验人们表现出强度偏差的假设，因为(a)他们根据不同时间内经历的不同情绪的详细信息的可及性来判断情绪的强度，(b)有关即时情绪的信息通常比有关先前情绪的信息更容易获得。例如，这些研究将测试这样一种预测，即人们认为，恰好引起立即焦虑的恐怖主义风险比恰好引起先前焦虑的同等严重的风险更危险，更值得缓解。这些研究还将验证这样一种预测，即人们认为，与恰好引起先前痛苦的人道主义痛苦相比，恰好引起立即痛苦的人道主义痛苦更严重，更值得投入慈善资源。提出的研究将推进有关情感、判断和决策之间相互作用的基础科学知识。了解这些过程将使公民和决策者能够做出更明智的决定。

How do people make judgments and decisions about the intensity of different emotions experienced over time? How, for example, do people decide upon the allocation of resources toward mitigating different frightening risks they learn about over time? Do they devote more to preventing the kinds of bad things they have recently experienced intense emotion about rather than those that might be more likely but that they have not so recently experienced intensely? Similarly, how do they decide upon the allocation of charitable funds among different distressing humanitarian needs? Do they give more to causes that have distressed them recently rather than some time ago? This research will extend preliminary studies demonstrating that people exhibit an intensity bias when they make such temporal emotional comparisons, judging immediate emotions to be more intense, all else equal, than previous emotions.Nine studies will test the hypothesis that people exhibit an intensity bias because (a) they judge emotional intensity based on the accessibility of detailed information about different emotions experienced over time, and (b) information about immediate emotions is usually more accessible than information about previous emotions. The studies will test, for example, the prediction that people judge risks of terrorism that happen to arouse immediate anxiety to be more dangerous and worthy of mitigation than equivalently severe risks that happen to have aroused previous anxiety. The studies will also test the prediction that people judge humanitarian suffering that happens to arouse immediate distress as more severe and worthy of charitable resources than humanitarian suffering that happens to have aroused previous distress. The proposed studies will advance basic scientific knowledge regarding the interplay between emotion, judgment, and decision-making. Understanding these processes will enable citizens and policy makers to make more informed decisions.