Collaborative Research: Procurement Mechanism Design

这笔赠款为更好地理解将拍卖与非竞争性合同相结合的一类采购机制所需的分析和实验工作提供了资金。这些机制在实践中被广泛使用，因为它们承诺保留拍卖所提供的优势(透明度、竞争性价格)，同时允许买方保留对其最终供应商身份的控制权，并与这些供应商保持长期关系。但这些机制的理论和实践特征还没有得到很好的理解。将对买方和供应商可以在拍卖和非竞争性合同之间进行选择的机制进行正式建模和分析。这些机制的理论属性将在简单的环境中以及在协同效应和多属性产品的环境中进行审查。涉及人类受试者和真实货币激励的实验室实验将被用来验证分析结果。实验室设置将旨在实施理论假设并实现高水平的内部有效性，同时将使用供应链采购背景以实现一定程度的外部有效性。如果成功，这项研究的结果将有助于改进供应链内采购机制的设计，并使人们更好地理解拍卖和非竞争性合同相结合的机制的理论和实践属性。这项工作的主要目标是就如何改进采购机制以提高复杂环境下的贸易收益提出建议。这项研究还将使人们更好地了解具有协同效应和复杂多属性产品的环境中的竞争性投标，这是整个社会的商业和政府机构的一个重要问题。该软件和实验方案将可供其他研究人员使用。拟议的工作将有助于发展基础设施，用于向各级学生讲授采购和市场设计方面的问题。

This grant provides funding for the analytical and experimental work required to better understand a class of procurement mechanism that combine auctions with non-competitive contracts. These mechanisms are widely used in practice because they offer a promise to preserve the advantages that auctions offer (transparency, competitive price) while allowing the buyers to retain control over the identities of their ultimate suppliers, and maintain longer term relationships with those suppliers. But theoretical and practical characteristics of these mechanisms are not well-understood. Mechanisms in which buyers and suppliers can choose between auctions and non-competitive contracts will be formally modeled and analyzed. The theoretical properties of these mechanisms will be examined both in simple settings, as well as in settings with synergies and multi-attribute products. Laboratory experiments involving human subjects and real monetary incentives will be used to validate the analytical results. The laboratory setting will be designed to implement theoretical assumptions and achieve a high level of internal validity, while at the same time the supply-chain procurement context will be used in order to achieve a measure of external validity. Some key experimental treatments will be replicated using participants with managerial expertise in the area of procurement and sourcing.If successful, the results of this research will lead to improvements in the design of procurement mechanisms within supply chains, as well as to a better understanding of theoretical and practical attributes of mechanisms that combine auctions and non-competitive contracts. The primary goal of this work is to provide recommendations on how procurement mechanisms can be improved to enhance gains from trade in complex environments. The research will also provide a better understanding of competitive bidding in environments with synergies and complex multi-attribute products, which is an issue of importance to commercial and government institutions throughout society. The software and experimental protocols will be available for use to other researchers. The proposed work will contribute to the development of infrastructure used to teach issues in procurement and market design to students at all levels.