CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Detection and Isolation of Malicious Inclusions in Secure Hardware (DIMINISH)

由于全球经济的压力，先进集成电路（IC）的制造正在转移到国外的代工厂。对于许多无晶圆厂的公司和政府机构来说，将其设计运往海外进行低成本制造已经成为一种普遍趋势。这些趋势引起了人们对美国军事系统、关键站点甚至依赖高性能芯片的家用电器可能受到威胁或攻击的严重担忧。这些系统存在各种潜在的漏洞，这些漏洞是由硬件进程的恶意更改引起的，这些恶意更改可能会使这些重要系统在未来某个时间无法运行。这种恶意操纵的IC预定安装在美国武器systems.The重点的研究是对自动测试模式生成（ATPG）和信号分析技术的发展，用于检测和定位恶意的改动，例如，插入木马电路，在晶圆探针aor封装测试作为一种手段，提高芯片的可信度的水平。特别是，技术，显着提高了静态电流和瞬态电流检测和定位木马电路的技术的分辨率进行了研究。 该项目的第二个重点是开发ATPG方法，旨在检测芯片的隐藏改变，例如，插入或削弱的导线或晶体管，导致芯片在现场后期失效。

Due to global economy pressures, fabrication of advanced integrated circuits (ICs) is migrating to foreign foundries. It has become a common trend for many fab-less companies and government agencies to ship their designs offshore for low-cost fabrication. These trends have raised serious concerns regarding possible threats or attacks on US military systems, critical sites and even household appliances that rely on high performance chips. There are various potential vulnerabilities to such systems caused by malicious alterations of hardware processes that might make these vital systems inoperable at some future time. Such malicious manipulation of ICs slated for installation in US weapon systems cannot be tolerated.The focus of this research is on the development of automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) and signal analysis techniques for detecting and locating malicious alterations, e.g. the insertion of Trojan circuits, during wafer probe aor package test as a means of improving the level of trustworthiness of the chip. In particular, techniques that significantly improve the resolution of quiescent current and transient current techniques for detecting and locating Trojan circuits are investigated. A second focus of the project is on the development of ATPG methods designed to detect hidden alterations of the chip, e.g., inserted or weakened wires or transistors which cause the chip to fail later in the field.