Package Auctions

本研究项目探讨不同包装拍卖设计在不同环境下的表现。过去的研究表明，一揽子拍卖机制在不存在市场出清价格和标准拍卖预期表现不佳的情况下可能是有效的。该项目通过实验室实验结合模拟方法来测试博弈论模型，将PI与斯坦福大学的Paul Milgrom的研究扩展到几个方向。该团队探讨了不同的投标语言是否会带来不同的、更好的结果。它们衡量机构投标人所面临的约束（如预算约束）的影响。该项目具有更广泛的影响，因为其结果将帮助拍卖设计师识别不同环境下不同拍卖形式的优缺点。寻求使用拍卖的个人、公司或政府在选择用于进行拍卖的具体方法时将拥有更全面的知识。

This research project explores the performance of different package auction designs in different environments. Past research shows that package auction mechanisms can be effective in settings where market clearing prices do not exist and standard auctions are expected to perform poorly. This project extends the PI's research with his collaborator Paul Milgrom of Stanford University in several directions by conducting laboratory experiments combined with simulation methods to test the game theoretic models. The team explores whether different bidding languages lead to different and better results. They measure the impact of constraints, like budget constraints, that are faced by institutional bidders.This project has broader impact because the results will help auction designers to identify the pros and cons of different auction formats in different environments. Individuals, firms, or governments who seek to use auctions will have more comprhensive knowledge when choosing the specific methods used to conduct their auctions.