NeTS: Small: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Agile and Resilient Wireless Systems

无线网络底层的广播媒体使各种设备能够使用共享信道进行通信，但也使它们严重暴露于对手面前。我们越来越依赖无线网络来连接网络基础设施，并监控我们的物理基础设施，这为复杂的拒绝服务攻击打开了大门，对我们的经济和国土安全造成了潜在的破坏性影响。该项目为敏捷和弹性无线系统寻求一个新的博弈论框架。该框架将通信节点和对手之间的交互建模为双人游戏，其策略由各种协议选择和跨层攻击定义。这种博弈论范式的中心论点是，弹性无线系统需要高度敏捷，快速混合策略以挫败自适应攻击者。这个项目背后的研究方法有三个方面。第一个组件制定游戏，捕捉通信节点和对手之间跨越无线系统基本构建块的复杂交互。第二个组成部分涉及与这些博弈相关的优化问题和平衡。最后一个组件在两个世界原型中实现了体系结构和解决方案：用于802.11网络的基于linux的平台，以及用于研究更复杂机制的软件定义无线电平台。该项目解决了保护我们的无线基础设施免受DoS攻击的关键需求。所进行的研究将导致(a)对无线系统进行新的博弈论分析，量化漏洞和最坏情况，并确定有希望的方法来挫败此类攻击；(b)高度敏捷的跨层协议，对最具适应性的对手具有弹性；(c)在现实系统中实施和评估这些协议的新工具。

Broadcast media underlying wireless networks enable diverse devices to communicate using shared channels, but also leave them severely exposed to adversaries. Our increased reliance on wireless networks for connectivity to the cyber-infrastructure, and for monitoring our physical infrastructure, has opened the door for sophisticated denial-of-service attacks with potentially devastating effects on our economy and homeland security.This project pursues a new game-theoretic framework for agile and resilient wireless systems. The framework models the interaction between communicating nodes and adversaries as two-player games, with strategies defined by various protocol choices and cross-layer attacks. A central thesis of this game-theoretic paradigm is that resilient wireless systems need to be highly agile, rapidly mixing strategies to thwart adaptive attackers.The research methodology underlying this project is threefold. The first component formulates games capturing complex interactions between communicating nodes and adversaries across basic building blocks of wireless systems. The second component concerns optimization problems and equilibria associated with these games. The final component realizes the architecture and solutions in tworeal-world prototypes: a Linux-based platform for 802.11 networks, and a Software-Defined Radio platform for studying more sophisticated mechanisms.This project addresses the critical need of protecting our wireless infrastructure from DoS attacks. The research conducted will lead to (a) new game-theoretic analysis of wireless systems quantifying vulnerabilities and worst-case scenarios, and identifying promising methods to thwart such attacks; (b) highly agile cross-layer protocols that are resilient to the most adaptive adversaries; (c) new tools for implementing and evaluating these protocols in real-world systems.