TC: Small: Provably Anonymous Networking Through Secure Function Evaluation

计算机网络中的匿名通信通常依赖于通过级联混合对传输进行过滤。客户端选择多个代理节点，这些代理节点修改并模糊消息的来源，以便使得对源和目的地之间的关系的检测极其困难。虽然这种架构对于全球被动的对手来说并不强大，但越来越多的文献表明，即使是中等能力的对手也可以使用这些网络连接双方之间的通信。因此，必须探索确保更强匿名性的新技术。本计画将在安全功能评估的基础上，发展一种新的匿名网路架构，以提供匿名的密码保证。这些可证明匿名网络（PAN）通过保持不知道已经发生的消息交换来保护通信的参与者免受tra #64259;c分析攻击。然而，实现一个更值得信赖的架构并不是简单地随意组装上述组件的结果。相反，该系统必须仔细地组成，以避免在通信信道的识别中有用的信息的泄漏。该项目的成果不仅将用于加强研究生和本科生课程，而且还将用于开发一种工具，以帮助卡特中心的成员管理观察选举，而不必担心窃听。

Anonymous communication in computer networks generally relies upon the filtering of traffic through a cascade of mixes. Clients select a number of proxy nodes that modify and obscure the origin of a message so as to make the detection of a relationship between source and destination extremely difficult. While this architecture is known to not be robust against a globally passive adversary, an ever growing body of literature has demonstrated that even moderately capable adversaries can link the communications between two parties using these networks. Accordingly, new techniques ensuring stronger levels of anonymity must be explored. This project will develop a new architecture for anonymity networks offering cryptographic guarantees of anonymity based on a foundation of Secure Function Evaluation. These Provably Anonymous Networks (PANs) protect the participants of communication from traffic analysis attacks by remaining unaware that the exchange of messages has occurred. However, realizing a more trustworthy architecture is not simply the result of haphazardly assembling the above components. Rather, this system must be carefully composed so as to avoid the leakage of information useful in the identification of a communication channel. The results of this project will not only be used to enhance graduate and undergraduate curriculum, but will also be used to develop a tool to assist members of the Carter Center administer observe elections without fear of eavesdropping.