Collaborative Research: Reputational Bargaining with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information About Fundamentals

经济学家用来预测双边讨价还价结果的模型大多假设信息对称：两个讨价还价的人知道他们需要了解对方的一切。但现实世界中的讨价还价通常是在双边不对称信息下进行的：双方都希望更多地了解对方的目标、优先事项、优势和劣势。这些情况几十年来一直没有得到经济学家的把握。这个奖项基金致力于一种新的方法，在双边信息不对称的情况下模拟双边讨价还价。它在很大程度上借鉴了25年前创立的声誉形成文献，最初用于研究进入以前垄断的市场。这个想法是，认识到讨价还价者形成声誉的动机(因为顽固，或报复，等等)不仅丰富了分析，还给出了更清晰的结果。希望更好地了解讨价还价者在这些丰富的信息环境中的行为。需要研究的谈判问题出现在国家之间、监管机构和公司之间、供应商和生产商之间，以及公司和工会之间。更好地理解讨价还价将为劳动法、国际法和监管政策的制定以及其他许多应用提供有价值的见解。

Most of the models economists use to predict outcomes of bilateral bargaining assume symmetric information: the two bargainers know everything they need to know about one another. But bargaining in the real world is usually conducted under two-sided asymmetric information: both parties wish they knew more about the other side's goals, priorities, strengths and weaknesses. These situations have eluded economists' grasp for many decades.This award funds work on a new approach to modeling bilateral bargaining with two-sided asymmetric information. It borrows heavily from the reputation formation literature initiated twenty-five years ago and first used to study entry into previously monopolized markets. The idea is that recognizing bargainer's incentives to form reputations (for being stubborn, or retaliatory, and so on) not only enriches the analysis, but also gives clearer results. The hope is to better understand how bargainers in these rich informational environments behave.The kinds of bargaining problems to be studied arise between countries, between regulators and firms, between suppliers and producers, and between firms and unions. A better understanding of bargaining will provide valuable insights for the formulation of labor law, international law, and regulatory policy, among many other applications.