Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Judicial Reform and Court Curbing in Comparative Perspective

立法者何时以及为何寻求改革以授权或限制国家司法机构，是什么使这些努力取得成功？ 司法独立是地球仪各地民主倡导者经常提到的“首要任务”，但人们对政治精英如何看待或重视独立的司法机构，以及更广泛的政治竞争模式如何影响司法机构和部门间交流知之甚少。 这个项目是一个新的方法来理解这一现象，明确参加微观层面的政治动机当选官员面临的决定，以限制或授权的国家judiciary.This研究解释司法改革建议作为一个“位置”的机会，当选官员，先进的精英为自己的选举收益。 以这种方式解释部门间的接触--将其完全植根于雄心勃勃的民选官员的战略形象--提供了一种将立法和司法机构之间的关系理论化的新方法。 调查员扩展了这一概念的立场，作为一个可以理解的参考选举激励机制，探索这一现象跨国。 具体而言，这项研究预计，在选举机构和政治激励的基础上，司法改革的频率、理由和最终通过的可能性会产生明显的后果。 在制度激励立法者将自己与政党政纲区分开来的地方，研究预计改革提案将更加频繁，在具体政策结果方面是合理的，但很少会对根本改变司法制度构成可信的威胁。 选举制度的跨国和时间序列变化以及公众对司法的信任为这些假设提供了一个最佳的测试场，本研究将法院置于更大的政治冲突和竞争的竞技场中，有助于我们理解司法能动主义和司法独立的政治基础。 一个独立的司法机构-一个不受外部政治影响的司法机构-被视为促进人权、经济发展所必需的财产权和巩固法治的关键所在。 通过首先了解政治精英如何寻求为自己的政治利益塑造司法机构，以及是什么使他们成功地这样做，我们可以开始确定增加司法影响力和参与的必要和充分条件。

When and why do legislators seek reforms to empower or restrict the national judiciary, and what makes these efforts successful? Judicial independence is an oft cited "top priority" to democracy advocates around the globe, yet very little is known about how an independent judiciary is viewed or valued by political elites, or how broder patterns of political competition implicate judicial institutions and inter-branch exchange. This project is a novel approach to understanding this phenomenon by explicitly attending to micro-level political incentives elected officials face when deciding to restrict or empower a national judiciary.This research interprets judicial reform proposals as a "position-taking" opportunity for elected officials, advanced by elites for their own electoral gain. Interpreting inter-branch engagement in this way - rooting it squarely in a strategic profile of ambitious elected officials - offers a novel way to theorize relations between legislative and judicial institutions. The investigator extends this notion of position-taking as one which can be understood with reference to electoral incentives to explore this phenomenon cross-nationally. Specifically, the research anticipates observable consequences in the frequency of, justification for, and likelihood of eventual adoption of judicial reforms on the basis of electoral institutions and political incentives. Where institutions incentivize legislators to differentiate themselves from their party's platform, the research expects reform proposals to be more frequent, to be justified in terms of specific policy outcomes, but will only rarely constitute a credible threat to fundamentally altering judicial institutions. Cross-national and time-serial variation of electoral institutions and public confidence in the judiciary provide an optimal testing ground for these hypotheses.This research will contribute to our understanding of the political basis of judicial activism and independence by situating courts in larger arena of political conflict and competition. An independent judiciary - one that is impervious to external political influence - is seen as a critical locus for the promotion of human rights, the property rights necessary for economic development and the entrenchment of the rule of law. By first understanding how political elites seek to shape judicial institutions for their own political gain and what makes them successful in doing so, we can begin to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for increased judicial influence and participation.