Conditions for nuclear reversals among U.S. allies

该项目旨在解释为什么美国盟友的外交政策制定者批准了各自国家的核逆转。目前占主导地位的解释只有部分得到经验事实的支持，因此需要进一步完善。这一占主导地位的解释借鉴了美国提供的所谓的扩展威慑(Tertrais 2011；国防科学委员会2008；国务院国际安全顾问委员会2007；Dunn 2006；Davis/Reiss 2000；Reiss 1994；Nye 1985)。根据这一理论，与美国结盟意味着为其合作伙伴提供核保护伞，从而意味着或明或暗的安全保障，从而使独立的核防御能力过时。美国在防扩散方面的联盟的效率在过去得到了惊人的证明，并导致美国几个盟友的外交政策精英放弃了已经存在的核武器活动，这一过程被称为核逆转。当仔细审查时，基于联盟的核逆转理论被证明是不可靠的。美国盟友的核逆转得到了各自外交决策者(即日本、韩国、台湾、加拿大和德国)的批准，这与美国盟友(英国、法国、以色列和巴基斯坦)继续发展核武器的情况形成了鲜明对比。然而，案例研究已经证明，美国联盟的保护是防止国家核化的一个原因因素(Green/Furukawa，2008年；Pollack/Reiss，2004年)。因此，我们需要包括更多的变量，以增强或限制美国联盟的防扩散效果。改进基于联盟的核逆转理论的必要性已被反复强调(例如，Paul 2000：8，Müler/Schmidt 2010：145)。该项目旨在推进基于联盟的核逆转理论，并为美国盟友的外交决策者同意其国家核逆转的条件提供一个差异化的、经验上有效的解释。除了这一理论目标之外，该项目的目的是为德国和欧洲不扩散政策的制定做出贡献。这尤其涉及到一个问题，即面对伊朗的核武器活动，如何防止美国在该地区的盟友(即埃及、阿拉伯联合酋长国、土耳其)的决策者效仿伊朗的做法(例如，Lindsay/Takeyh 2010；Moran/Russel 2009；WINEP 2009)。

The project aims at explaining why foreign policy decision makers of U.S. allies approved their respective nations nuclear reversals. The currently dominant explanation is only partially supported by empirical facts and therefore needs to be further refined.This dominant explanation draws on the so-called extended deterrence provided by the U.S. (Tertrais 2011; Defense Science Board 2008; Department of State International Security Advisory Board 2007; Dunn 2006; Davis/Reiss 2000; Reiss 1994; Nye 1985). According to this theory, an alliance with the U.S. implicates a nuclear umbrella for its partners and thus an explicit or implicit security guarantee that renders an independent capacity for nuclear defense obsolete. The efficiency of U.S. alliances with regards to non-proliferation has been spectacularly proven in the past and has led the foreign policy elites of several U.S. allies to renounce already existing nuclear weapons activities, a process called nuclear reversal.When put under closer scrutiny, alliance-based theories of nuclear reversal do not prove to be reliable. Numerous cases of nuclear reversals of U.S. allies that were approved by their respective foreign policy decision makers (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada and Germany) stand in stark contrast to cases of continued nuclear weapons development by U.S. allies (Great Britain, France, Israel and Pakistan). However, case studies have proven the relevance of U.S.-alliance protection as a causal factor for the prevention of states going nuclear (Green/Furukawa 2008; Pollack/Reiss 2004). Therefore, we need to include additional variables that enhance or limit the proliferation-mitigating effect of U.S. alliances. This need for refining the theory of alliance-based nuclear reversals has been stressed repeatedly (e.g. Paul 2000: 8, Müller/Schmidt 2010: 145).This project intends to advance the theory of alliance-based nuclear reversals and to provide a differentiated, empirically valid explanation of the conditions under which foreign policy decision makers of U.S.-allies consent to their countries nuclear reversal. Beyond this theoretical goal, the project aims at providing a contribution to the formulation of German and European non-proliferation policy. In particular, this concerns the question as to how, in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons activities, the decision makers of U.S. allies in the region (i.e. Egypt, Sau-di-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey) can be prevented from following the Iranian example (e.g. Lindsay/Takeyh 2010; Moran/Russel 2009; WINEP 2009).