Coordination and Information Design

该奖项资助经济理论方面的研究，该研究考虑如何利用信息披露来说服个人协调行动，使每个人都受益。例如，假设一家银行面临潜在的银行挤兑，而储户保险不可用。在这种情况下，政府政策披露有关该行全部贷款组合和出色的长期盈利能力的信息，可能会说服储户留在该行。研究小组希望了解在两种不同情况下披露信息的最佳方式；第一，当所有个人都看到披露时，第二，当可以向一些人披露，而不是向其他人披露时。该项目与银行和金融领域的许多应用程序相关，可能有助于改善旨在促进金融稳定的政策，如所谓的“压力测试”。该项目研究的是市场中的说服行为，在这个市场中，大量代理人必须选择是协调社会合意的行动，还是采取行动对抗现状。代理人被赋予了关于潜在经济基本面的不同的私人信息。分析的重点是最优信息披露的性质，无论是在机制设计者必须向所有参与者披露相同信息的情况下，还是在私人披露的情况下。该项目结合了经济学理论的不同领域的想法：稳健的机制设计、说服游戏和协调游戏。该团队还将扩展他们的分析，以考虑在政策制定者不确定市场参与者之间最初的信念分布的情况下披露政策的设计。他们还将考虑反复攻击的可能性和市场中最优政策的特征，在这些市场中，设计者在与市场沟通之前必须从被审查的实体那里征求信息。

This award funds research in economic theory that considers how to use information disclosures in order to persuade individuals to coordinate actions to benefit everyone. For example, suppose a bank faces a potential bank run and depositor insurance is not available. In this case, a government policy disclosing information about the bank's full portfolio of loans and excellent long-run profitability could convince depositors to stay with the bank. The research team wants to understand the best ways to disclose information under two different circumstances; first, when all individuals see the disclosures and second, when disclosures can be made to some people but not to others. The project is relevant to many applications in banking and finance and could help to improve policies designed to promote financial stability such as so-called 'stress-tests'.The project studies persuasion in markets in which a large number of agents must choose whether to coordinate on a socially-desirable action or else take action against the status quo. Agents are endowed with heterogeneous private information about the underlying economic fundamentals. The analysis focuses on properties of optimal information disclosures, both in the case in which the mechanism designer must disclose the same information to all participants as well as the case of private disclosures. The project combines ideas from separate areas of economic theory: robust mechanism design, persuasion games, and coordination games. The team will also extend their analysis to consider the design of disclosure policies in settings in which the policy maker is uncertain about the initial distribution of beliefs among market participants. They will also consider the possibility of repeated attacks and the characterization of optimal policies in markets in which the designer must solicit information from the entity under scrutiny prior to communicating with the market.