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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Selling Shares to Many Budget Constrained Bidders

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Selling Shares to Many Budget Constrained Bidders
经济学博士论文研究:向许多预算有限的投标人出售股票
批准号:
1919450
负责人:
John Kagel
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2019
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2019-07-01 至 2023-06-30

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中文摘要
翻译
此博士论文研究改进基金将资助股票拍卖的效率和收益效应的研究。股票拍卖有时也称为代金券拍卖。在这种拍卖中,每个竞标者支付她的出价,并得到等于她的出价除以所有出价的总和的一小部分物品。这些拍卖已被用于公有资产私有化,也被用于加密货币众筹销售。该项目将使用实验室实验将股票拍卖的结果与首次价格拍卖的结果进行比较。研究结果将帮助我们了解,对于企业和寻求增加收入的政府来说,共享拍卖方法是否可能是一种实用的替代方案。coPI开发了一个理论模型,该模型预测,如果竞标者没有预算限制或只面临弱约束,那么股票拍卖将由第二价格拍卖、第一价格拍卖和所有付费拍卖主导。该理论预测,在较强的预算约束下,股票拍卖比二次或一次价格拍卖能获得更高的效率和收益,尽管所有的付费拍卖仍能获得更好的结果。实验室实验将检验这些预测是否成立。研究结果将使我们对股票拍卖方式下的竞价行为和经济绩效有新的认识。该项目还增加了我们对预算有限的投标人的拍卖的理解。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
This doctoral dissertation research improvement grant will fund a study of the efficiency and revenue effects of share auctions. Share auctions are also sometimes called voucher auctions. In this kind of auction, every bidder pays what she bids and receives a fraction of the item equal to her bid divided by the sum of all bids. These auctions have been used to privatize publicly owned assets and have also been used for cryptocurrency crowd sales. The project will use lab experiments to compare the results of share auctions to the results of first price auctions. The results will help us understand whether or not share auction methods could be a practical alternative for use in business and by governments who seek to raise revenues.The coPI has developed a theoretical model that predicts that the share auction is dominated by second price auctions, first price auctions, and all pay auctions if bidders are not budget constrained or face only a weak constrain. With a strong budget constraint, the theory predicts that share auctions can achieve higher efficiency and revenue than that second or first price auctions, although all pay auctions still give better results. The lab experiments will test whether these predictions hold. The results will give us new understanding of bidding behavior and economic performance when share auction methods are used. The project also adds to our understanding of auctions with budget constrained bidders.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
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会议论文
Collaborative Research: Individual and Team Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Games
  • 批准号:
    2018704
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $24.09万
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 负责人:
    John Kagel
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research: Individual and Team Behavior in Strategic Interactions
  • 批准号:
    1630288
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $23.43万
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 负责人:
    John Kagel
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research: Experimental Studies of Strategic Decision Making by Groups and Individuals
  • 批准号:
    1226460
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $21.34万
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 负责人:
    John Kagel
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research: Experimental Studies on Group Decision Making in Strategic Environments
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