Bringing policies back in: Explaining payoff allocation in coalition governments

联盟政党如何分配收益？政党进入联合政府时，在纲领立场和部长职位方面，在多大程度上得到了它们想要的？组成联合政府的政党为了进入政府而联合起来，但他们追求不同的政策目标并争夺职位。因此，各联盟党必须就执政期间应执行的政策和部长职位的分配达成协议。因此，在立法任期开始时，联盟政党进行密集的谈判。他们就部长职位的分配进行谈判，并制定一项联合协议，规定下一任期的政策优先事项。虽然关于联合政府的文献已经投入了相当大的注意力来解释哪些政党有可能组成联盟，并预测部长职位的分配（例如，参见Laver &斯科菲尔德，1990; Laver & Shepsle，1996; Martin &史蒂文森，2001），但政策收益的分配在很大程度上被忽视了。由于了解政策和办公室是如何分布在联合政府的政治代表性和决策者对公民的反应有着至关重要的影响，我们的目标是填补文献中的这一重要空白。我们追求两个主要目标，在这个研究项目：首先，我们将开发一个理论框架，概念化的联盟谈判作为一个二维的过程中，各方同时讨价还价的政策利益和部长级投资组合的分配。第二，我们将实证检验我们的理论预期，通过编制一个新的数据集的政策收益分配，这是基于内容分析的联盟协议谈判的400多个联合政府在27个西欧和东欧国家，并结合这个新的数据集的投资组合分配，内阁和政党的特点的信息。

How do coalition parties allocate payoffs? To what extent do political parties get what they want in terms of their programmatic stance and with regard to ministerial portfolios when they enter a coalition government? Political parties forming a coalition government join forces for the purpose of entering government, but they pursue different policy objectives and compete for offices. Coalition parties therefore have to come to an agreement with regard to policies that should be implemented during the time of office and with regard to the allocation of ministerial posts. At the beginning of the legislative term, coalition parties therefore engage in intensive bargaining. They negotiate the allocation of ministerial posts and formulate a coalition agreement that sets out the policy priorities for the upcoming term. While the literature on coalition governments has devoted considerable attention to explaining which parties are likely to form coalitions and to predicting the allocation of ministerial portfolios (see e.g. Laver & Schofield 1990; Laver & Shepsle 1996; Martin & Stevenson 2001), the allocation of policy payoffs has largely been neglected. Since understanding how policies and offices are distributed in coalition governments has crucial implications for political representation and the responsiveness of policy-makers to citizens, we aim at filling this important gap in the literature. We pursue two major goals in this research project: First, we will develop a theoretical framework that conceptualizes coalition negotiations as a two-dimensional process in which parties simultaneously bargain about the allocation of policy benefits and ministerial portfolios. Second, we will empirically test our theoretical expectations by compiling a novel dataset on policy payoff allocation that is based on a content analysis of coalition agreements negotiated by more than 400 coalition governments in 27 West and East European countries and by combining this new dataset with information on portfolio allocation, cabinet and party characteristics.