Internalist Theories of Intentionality and Modal Cognition

意向性理论试图凭借信念和欲望等精神状态能够与世界联系起来来解释。长期以来，内在主义理论一直占据主导地位，根据这种理论，精神状态的内容完全取决于一个人头脑中发生的事情。然而，在过去的几十年里，外部主义的解释已经变得流行，它指出这些内容也取决于外部环境。内在主义的衰落伴随着另一种传统观点的衰落，根据这种观点，模态事实，即，关于什么是可能的或必要的事实，可以通过非经验的手段，纯粹是先验的。本研究的第一个目的是探讨这两个命题之间的关系。在此之后，一个内在主义的帐户，是兼容的，我们有一个先验访问模态事实的可行性将被检查。

Theories of intentionality try to explain in virtue of what mental states such as beliefs and desires are capable of relating to the world. For a long time, internalist theories had been dominant, according to which the contents of mental states are completely determined by what occurs inside a person's head. In previous decades, however, externalist accounts have become prevalent, which state that these contents also depend on external circumstances. The decline of internalism was accompanied by that of another traditional view, according to which modal facts, i.e., facts about what is possible or necessary, can be known by non-empirical means, purely a priori. The first goal of the research project is to investigate the relation between these two theses. After that, the viability of an internalist account that is compatible with our having a priori access to modal facts will be examined.