Disagreement in Philosophy. Semantic and Epistemological Foundations

分歧是科学进步的动力。它指出错误并有助于改正。如果分歧不能随着时间的推移而消除，它就会给各方施加合理的压力，削弱或暂停判断。当一个特定学科中无处不在的不可解决的分歧时，它威胁到该学科的认识完整性。从表面上看，哲学似乎是这种威胁的一个范例。为了评估这一评估，本项目从解决歧见的语义和认识论开始。这两个焦点都属于当前国际哲学争论的热点。到目前为止，它们大多是单独讨论的。相比之下，本项目将讨论歧见的语义学和认识论的相互作用。它将使用这项调查的结果来分析哲学分歧的范例案例。在语义部分（A部分），我们将探讨不同类型的分歧，并检查其中哪一种暗示只有一方是正确的。这部分项目的一个核心主题将是识别和建模伪分歧的任务，以便双方互相交谈。在此背景下，我们将仔细审视当前关于完美分歧的辩论。此外，我们将探讨分歧是否以及如何与语境主义或相对主义语义学框架兼容并可以在其框架内建模。在认识论部分（B部分），我们将探讨在什么一般条件下实质性分歧是否需要暂停各方的判断。一方面，相关条件考虑到失败的逻辑。另一方面，它们关注的问题是相同的证据是否可以证明相互矛盾的判断是正确的。在应用部分（C部分），我们将探讨哲学中普遍存在的实质性分歧，以及我们应该如何理性地应对它。我们将使用关于当前认识论分歧的一般考虑和两个案例研究来在这一点上取得进展。沿着这条路线，我们将试图对哲学的认知完整性是否受到无处不在的不可解决的哲学分歧的威胁这一主要问题给出至少部分的答案。

Disagreement is a driving force of progress in the sciences. It indicates mistakes and facilitates their correction. If disagreement does not dissolve over time, it puts rational pressure on all sides to weaken or suspend judgment. When indissoluble disagreement is ubiquitous within a particular discipline, it threatens the epistemic integrity of that discipline. Prima facie, philosophy seems to be a paradigm case of this threat. In order to evaluate this assessment, the present project starts with addressing the semantics and epistemology of disagreement. Both foci belong to the hot topics of the current international debates in philosophy. So far they have been mostly discussed in isolation from each other. In contrast, the present project will address the interplay of the semantics and epistemology of disagreement. It will use the results of this investigation to analyze paradigm cases of philosophical disagreement. In the semantic part (part A), we will explore different kinds of disagreement and examine which of them imply that only one side can be correct. One core theme of this part of the project will be the task of identifying and modeling pseudo-disagreement such that both parties talk past each other. Given this background, we will scrutinize on the current debate about faultless disagreement. Moreover, we will explore whether and how disagreement is compatible with and can be modeled within the framework of contextualist or relativist semantics. In the epistemological part (part B), we will explore whether and if so under what general conditions a substantial disagreement requires to suspend judgment of all parties. On the one hand, the relevant conditions regard the logic of defeat. On the other hand, they concern the issue of whether the same evidence can justify conflicting judgments. In the application part (part C), we will explore how pervasive substantial disagreement is in philosophy and how we should rationally react to it. We will use general considerations and two case studies about disagreement in current epistemology to make progress on this point. Taking this route, we will try to give at least a partial answer to the main question whether the epistemic integrity of philosophy is threatened by the ubiquity of indissoluble philosophical disagreement.