A1: Inductive metaphysics; methods of metaphysics

A1的目的是详细比较归纳形而上学(IM)和逻辑经验主义(LE)的方案。它是本研究单位第一个为期三年的项目A1的后续项目，“从古斯塔夫·西奥多·费克纳到埃里希·贝希尔及其以后的归纳形而上学研究计划”。前三年的主要重点是对19世纪出现的IM研究方案进行历史性和系统性的重建(G.Th。Fechner，R.H.Lotze，E.诉Hartmann，W.Wundt和其他人)和20世纪初(O.Külpe，E.Becher，A.Wenzl)。在第二个资助期，项目A1旨在利用第一个资助期的结果进行IM和LE的比较。主要论点是，虽然乍一看，IM和LE似乎是完全相反的立场，但更仔细的研究表明，LE和IM之间有许多有趣的接触点，甚至趋同，特别是当一个人不将LE限制在维也纳圈及其主角的狭窄阶段时。这些接触点从莫里茨·施利克和埃里希·贝克尔之间的对应，到鲁道夫·卡尔纳普后来软化科学与形而上学之间的边界，W·V·奎因的自然化形而上学，以及迈克尔·弗里德曼对LE的重新思考。对这些接触点的彻底考察将揭示：(I)IM和LE方案之间的关系，(Ii)这两个方案的倡导者所倡导的形而上学概念，以及(Iii)这些概念随时间的演变。这将有助于在归纳的基础上探索形而上学的可能性。

The aim of A1 is a detailed comparison of the programs of inductive metaphysics (IM) and logical empiricism (LE). It is intended as a follow-up to project A1 of the first 3-year period of this research unit, “The Research Program of Inductive Metaphysics from Gustav Theodor Fechner to Erich Becher and beyond.” The main focus in the first 3-year period was a historical and systematic reconstruction of the research program of IM as it emerged in the 19th century (G.Th. Fechner, R.H. Lotze, E. v. Hartmann, W. Wundt and others) and early 20th century (O. Külpe, E. Becher, A. Wenzl). In the second funding period, project A1 aims to use the results of the first period fora comparison of IM and LE. The main thesis is that, while at first glance it may look as if IM and LE are completely contrary positions, a closer examination shows that there are many interesting points of contact or even convergence between LE and IM, especially when one does not restrict LE to the narrow phase of the Vienna Circle and its protagonists. These points of contact range from the correspondencebetween Moritz Schlick and Erich Becher to Rudolf Carnap’s later softening of the boundary between science and metaphysics, W.V. Quine’s naturalized metaphysics, and Michael Friedman’s reconsideration of LE. A thorough investigation of these points of contact will shed light on:(i) the relations between the programs of IM and LE,(ii) the conceptions of metaphysics advocated by the proponents of both programs, and(iii) the evolution of these conceptions over time.This will contribute to the exploration of the possibility of metaphysics on an inductive basis.