The Design of International Organizations.Fostering Diplomatic Deliberation?

无论我们看宪法、创始条约还是国家和国际组织的议事规则，令人惊讶的是，许多关于行为者之间互动的规则为审议创造了空间，同时限制了讨论的时间。虽然后者可能会加快决策，但可能会降低决策的质量和合法性。最初的项目回答了两个研究问题：国际组织的制度设计有多强烈地试图引起外交审议，为什么国际组织在这方面有所不同？外交官在实践中参与审议的范围有多大？为什么外交审议在国际组织之间和政策周期的各个阶段都有所不同？在第一阶段，该项目回答了这两个问题，从而为IO制度设计和制度规则的实际使用提供了新的和重要的见解。项目扩展放大到设计，演员的做法和IO性能之间的关系。它将阐明审议的制度设计和审议的外交实践对信息作战绩效的四个不同组成部分的影响，即信息作战产出绩效（在给定的时间内采取的政策决定的数量），信息作战决策的速度（效率），信息作战解决问题的能力，以及信息作战的合法性。因此，与研究国际组织在审议制度设计和外交审议实践方面如何以及为什么不同的初始项目不同，为期一年的项目延期的研究设计是以x为中心的。它探讨了以下核心研究问题：如何以及在什么条件下做制度设计的规定和审议的做法影响IO性能？基于这一核心问题，项目将回答后续问题。这些问题包括：哪些制度设计要素和哪些外交实践对信息作战绩效有很强的积极影响，在什么条件下它们会相互加强？如何在理想的体制上配置国际组织，以促进高水平的业绩？信息作战性能的某些组成部分之间是否存在权衡，因此审慎的设计和实践只能以牺牲其他组成部分（例如决策速度）为代价来增加一个组成部分（例如合法性）？

Whether we look at constitutions, founding treaties, or the rules of procedure of states and International Organizations (IO), it is striking that many rules on interaction between actors create room for deliberation, whilst simultaneously limiting the time available for discussion. While the latter might speed up decision making, it could risk reducing its quality and legitimacy. The initial project answered two research questions: How strongly does the institutional design of IOs seek to induce diplomatic deliberation and why do IOs differ in this respect? How extensively do diplomats engage in deliberation in practice and why does diplomatic deliberation vary between IOs and over stages of a policy-cycle? In the first stage the project answered these two questions thereby providing novel and important insights into IO institutional design and the actual usage of institutional rules. The project extension zooms into the nexus between design, actor practices and IO performance. It will shed light on the effects of deliberative institutional design and deliberative diplomatic practices on four different components of IO performance, namely on IO output performance (number of policy decisions taken in a given period of time), on the speed of IO decision-making (efficiency), on IO problem-solving ability, and on IO legitimacy. Thus, unlike in the initial project that examined how and why IOs differ with respect to their deliberative institutional design and the diplomatic deliberative practices, the research design of the one-year project extension is x-centered. It examines the following core research question: How and under what conditions do institutional design provisions and deliberative practices impact IO performance? Based on this core question, the project will answer subsequent questions. These encompass the following ones: Which institutional design elements and which diplomatic practices have strong positive impacts on IO performance and under what conditions do they reinforce each other? How are IOs ideally institutionally configured in order to foster high levels of performance? Is there a tradeoff between some of the components of IO performance, so that deliberative design and practices can only increase one component (e.g. legitimacy) at the expense of others (e.g. speed of decision-making)?