Collective Leadership. Transformation of Power after Stalin and Mao, 1952-1957 und 1975-1981

​在苏联和中国，斯大林和毛的专制统治给社会、政治制度和经济带来了破坏，在人民中传播了恐惧和恐惧。毫无疑问，那些残暴的暴行正是由掌握了全部政治权力的暴君发起的。是他们发动了恐怖活动，并再次阻止了恐怖活动。​暴力停止了，是恐怖的肇事者自己，斯大林和毛的追随者和继承人，做了这一切。他们怎么能在不改变统治制度的情况下结束暴力呢？为什么暴君的追随者会同意停止恐怖并保持他们之间的和平？这是我们研究项目的主题，致力于从专制到集体领导转变的头几年。​暴君死后，政治制度只有作为团结的代表才能稳定下来。在苏联，主席团（政治局）、部长会议和最高苏维埃在斯大林去世前几个小时召开会议，协调过渡；一个月后，他们为自己的统治选择了一个词：集体领导。​​斯大林和毛都没有选择王储，准备继任者，或者说他们希望如何进行过渡。苏联和中国的权力继承人对这一挑战的回答有何不同？莫斯科和北京的改革者相互学习了吗？这项比较调查旨在探讨集体领导原则如何将新统治者联系在一起并使人民团结起来，将受到规则和权力执行、合法性和沟通以及期望的信任和可靠性等方面的指导。

Stalinism and Maoism were regimes of terror to which millions of people fell victim. In the Soviet Union and in China, Stalin’s and Mao’s despotic rule brought destruction to society, the political system and economy, spreading fear and terror among people. There is no doubt that those brutal excesses were initiated by the very tyrants who had assumed complete political power. It was them who started terror campaigns and stopped them again. After the death of Stalin in March 1953 and Mao Zedong in September 1976, mass terror came to an end, but not the systems that had helped the tyrants spread fear. Violence was stopped, and it was the perpetrators of terror themselves, Stalin’s and Mao’s henchmen and heirs, who did it. How could they put an end to violence without changing the system of rule? And why did the tyrants' followers agree to stop the terror and keep peace among themselves? This is the topic of our research project, which is dedicated to the first years of the transformation from tyranny to collective leadership. Both in the Soviet Union of the early 1950s and in late-1970s China it was a so-called ‘collective leadership’ that engaged in crisis management and transformed a totalitarian into an authoritarian regime. After the death of the tyrants, the political systems could be stabilized only as representations of unity. In the Soviet Union, the Presidium (Politburo), the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviet convened hours before Stalin's death to orchestrate the transition; a month later, they chose a phrase for their rule: collective leadership. In China, Hua Guofeng, who succeeded Mao as the administrator of his ideological heritage, took over in the autumn of 1976. However, after the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping (July 1977) and Chen Yun (December 1978), the Standing Committee of the Politburo acted as a unified group, despite the conflicts in China's central leadership. Neither Stalin nor Mao had chosen a crown prince, prepared a successor, or said how they wanted the transition to take place. How did the answers that the heirs of power gave to this challenge differ in the Soviet Union and in China? Did Moscow's and Beijing's reformers learn from each other? This comparative investigation which seeks to explore how the principle of collective leadership tied together the new rulers and integrated the population, will be guided by the dimensions of rule and power enforcement, legitimacy and communication, and trust and reliability of expectations.