The Philosophical Basis of Connexive Logic

这个项目将调查关联逻辑的哲学基础，从这个意义上说，它仔细地检查了使关联变得可信的直觉，然后开发了这些直觉的最佳形式处理。|联系逻辑的特征在于：||亚里士多德(A→？A)和？(？A？→？A)有效。
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(A？→？B)→？(A？→？B)和(A？→？B)？？(A？→？B)？(A？→？B)。||康涅夫逻辑是非经典逻辑中一个非常有趣的领域，它已经存在了很长一段时间。不得不承认，在这段时间的大部分时间里，它都被花在了普遍感兴趣的边线上。然而，在过去的几年里，这种情况已经发生了变化，人们对连接性给予了更多的关注，我认为这种关注是完全值得的：这个项目提案基于这样一种信念，即连接性是基于非常强大的自然语言直觉，而逻辑学家和语言哲学家都不应该忽视这一点。||也就是说，在早期的工作中，我对关联逻辑的本质提出了一种原创性的、有点修正主义的观点，我相信这是对早期图景的改进，也是对非关联逻辑学家来说更难忽视的。我对关联企业的重新构思已发表在两篇题为《强烈的关联性》和《谦逊的关联性》的论文中，这两篇论文都包含了对关联原则亚里士多德和博伊提乌斯的修改。此外，在未发表的著作中，我认为自然语言语用学可能在解释部分关联直觉方面发挥作用(所有作品都附在本提案之后)。||本项目的目的是通过将其主要应用于两个不同的逻辑环境来为该REVISIONISTIC观点发展进一步的论点：条件逻辑(又名。具有可变严格条件的逻辑，最为人所知的是对D.Lewis和R.Stalnaker风格的反事实的分析)，以及适合于处理M.Dummett风格的意义理论的推理方面的构造逻辑。||借鉴这两个应用的教训，我希望进一步巩固我对纵容逻辑的哲学基础的看法，形成一幅连贯和令人信服的图景，我的目标是在更多的论文和一本包罗万象的专著中发表这幅图景。

This project will investigate the philosophical basis of connexive logic, in the sense that it carefully examines the intuitions that make connexivity plausible and then develops the best formal treatment of these intuitions. ||Connexive logics are characterized by the following principles: ||ARISTOTLE¬(A → ¬A) and ¬(¬A → A) are valid.
 ||BOETHIUS
(A → B) → ¬(A → ¬B) and (A → ¬B) → ¬(A → B) are valid. ||Connexive logic is a very interesting field in non-classical logic that has been around for a long time. Most of that time, it has to be admitted, it has spent on the side-lines of general interest. This, however, has been changing over the last years in which much more attention has been paid to connexivity, attention that I believe is wholly deserved: This project proposal is based on the conviction that connexivity is based on very strong natural language intuitions that should not be ignored by logicians and philosophers of language alike. ||That said, in earlier work I have developed an original and somewhat revisionist view on the nature of connexive logic, which I am convinced is an improvement over the earlier picture as well as one which is much harder to dismiss for non-connexive logicians. My re-framing of the connexive enterprise has been published in two papers entitled “Strong Connexivity” and “Humble Connexivity”, which both contain modifications of the connexive principles, ARISTOTLE and BOETHIUS. Moreover, in unpublished work I have argued that natural language pragmatics might have a role in explaining parts of the connexive intuitions (all works are appended to this proposal).|| The aim of this project is to develop further arguments for that revisionistic view primarily by applying it in two distinct logical environments: Conditonal logics (a.k.a. logics with variably strict conditionals, best known as analyses for counterfactuals in the style of D. Lewis and R. Stalnaker) and constructive logics suitable for handling the inferential aspects of a theory of meaning in the style of M. Dummett. ||Drawing on the lessons of these two applications, I hope to further consolidate my views on the philosophical basis of connexive logic into a coherent and convincing picture, which I will aim to publish in further papers and an encompassing monograph.