Welfare Analysis of Market Structures in Network Public Utility Industries : A Contract Theory

本研究旨在提供网路型公用事业产业市场结构之福利分析。我们运用契约理论来研究这一问题。我们的研究由三篇论文组成，我们在下面解释1。“联盟形成的制造或购买决策”（应用于LRIC在电信）我们不仅检查进入者的决定，而且还检查现任者的决定，当面对给定的接入价格时，通过形成联盟来确定网络设施的大小。我们表明，低效率的联盟形成的可能性，即使进入者作出有效的自制或购买的决定，无论其水平。将这一结果应用于电信行业，我们认为长期增量成本（LRIC）原则不能通过联盟的形成为宽带基础设施的投资提供适当的激励.“不确定性下的开放获取竞争“通过比较开放获取政策下的竞争和基于设施的竞争，考察开放获取政策对企业进入市场的积极性的影响。W表明，当不确定性或垄断利润较小时，接入费水平较高时，开放接入环境中的领先者比基于设施的竞争中的领先者更早进入.“企业内部的信息不对称影响寡头垄断的市场结果“我们考虑一个古诺市场竞争，其中每个企业的所有者雇用一名经理，让他通过降低生产成本来提高企业的效率。有两种类型的企业：在第一种类型的企业中，所有者和管理者之间存在信息不对称，而在第二种类型的企业中则不存在信息不对称。然后，我们表明，第二类企业的数量的增加带来了市场均衡中的预期消费者剩余的减少。

The purpose of this study is to provide welfare analysis of market structures in network pubic utility industries. We apply a contract theory to study this issue. Our study consists of three papers, which we explain in the followings1."Make-or-Buy Decisions with Coalition Formation" (with an application to LRIC in Telecommunications)We examine not only an entrant's decision, but also an incumbent's decision, on which size network facility is made by forming a coalition when faced with a given access price. We show the possibility for inefficient coalition formation, even though entrants make an efficient make-or-buy decision, irrespective of its level. Applying this result to telecommunication industry, we then claim that the long-run incremental cost (LRIC) principle cannot give an appropriate incentive for investing in broadband infrastructures through coalition formation.2."Competition with Open Access Policy under Uncertainty"Comparing a competition under open access policy with a facility-based competition, we try to examine the effect of open access policy on a firm's incentive to enter a market. W show that, when uncertainty or the monopoly profit is small and the level of access charge is high, a leader in open access environment enters earlier than the one in the facility-based competition.3."Informational Asymmetry within a Firm Affects an Oligopolistic Market Outcome"We consider a Cournot market competition in which the owner of each firm hires a manager and let him improve the firm's efficiency by reducing production costs. There are two types of firms: in the first type of firms, there is informational asymmetry between the owner and the manager, whereas it is not so in the second type of firms. We then show that an increase in the number of the second type of firms brings a decrease in the expected consumer surplus in the market equilibrium.