Empirical Analysis of Contracts in Venture Financing

观察到的日本风险金融的特点与硅谷不同。本文运用常用的“契约理论”框架对这些特点和难点进行了实证研究。该理论认为，在“企业家与风险资本”和“风险资本与终端投资者”两种委托代理关系存在的情况下，必须设计激励机制以使融资过程高效。本文主要考察了日本金融契约理论如何满足现实契约

Observed characteristics among venture finance in Japan are different from those in Silicon Valley. We empirically investigate those characteristics and difficulties with frequently used framework of "contract theory". The theory suggests that in the presence of two fold principal-agent relations in between - "entrepreneur and venture capital" and "venture capital and end-investors" -, incentive machanisms have to be designed to make the financing process efficientWe mainly investigate how financial contracting theory meets the real contracting in Japan