The Determination of Cross-shareholdings and the effect of Its Dissolution

主要的实证结果如下：（1）在银行融资和债券融资的关系中，托宾q值越小、利息覆盖率越低的日本企业对银行贷款的依赖程度越高。（ii）关于主银行在银行贷款中的作用，托宾q值越小、利息偿付率越低的日本企业，对主银行提供的短期贷款的依赖性越大。（iii）在承销商的选择上，与其他银行证券子公司相比，利息覆盖率高、负债资产比率高的日本企业更倾向于将主银行证券子公司作为债券承销的主承销商。（iv）在交叉持股方面，托宾q值越小，表明日本企业在主要银行的持股量就越大。结果（ii）和（iii）这强烈表明，主要银行系统的贷款行为受到限制，因为主要银行被迫向增长前景较小、增长可能性较大的公司提供额外的贷款。金融危机，而主要银行滥用他们的私人信息，以牺牲其他银行的债券承销为代价，为自己的利益。此外，结果（四）可能意味着一个负面的看法，主银行系统方面的股权。这些发现表明，日本大多数主要银行无法靠自己减少不良贷款。为了克服这个问题。当局可能需要将大部分日本主要银行国有化，并试图组织一个新的银行体系，以促进银行向增长前景更好但更有可能出现财务困境的公司提供贷款。

Our principal empirical results are summarized as follows :Our principal empirical results are summarized as follows :(i)In relation to bank versus bond financing, Japanese firms with a smaller Tobin's q and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly more on bank loans.(ii)In relation to the role of main banks in bank loans, Japanese firms with a smaller Tobin's q and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly more on short-term bank loans provided by main banks.(iii)In relation to the firm's choice of underwriters, Japanese firms with higher interest coverage and higher debt-asset ratios are more likely to use their main bank-owned securities subsidiaries than other bank-owned securities subsidiaries as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting.(iv)In relation to cross-shareholdings, a smaller Tobin's q indicates that Japanese firms have significantly more shareholdings by main banks than by the other financial intermediaries.In particular, results (ii) and (iii) indicate strongly that the lending behavior of the main bank system is constrained because main banks are forced to make additional loans to firms that have a smaller prospect of growth and a greater likelihood of financial distress, whereas main banks misuse their private information for their self-interest at the expense of the other banks in bond underwriting. Furthermore, result (iv) may imply a negative view of the main bank system with respect to shareholdings. These findings suggest that most of the major Japanese banks cannot decrease their bad loans by themselves. To overcome this problem. the authorities may need to nationalize most of the major Japanese banks and attempt to organize a new banking system that promotes bank lending to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of financial distress.