Financial Innovation, Securitization, and Corporate Governance

这项研究开发了一个框架，用于在有大型投资者进行监控的情况下分析证券设计问题，以约束公司的管理。由于大投资者只享受其监测活动带来的部分好处，但产生了所有相关成本，她需要安排。如果她不能承诺在设计和发布安全之前进行任何先前级别的监测，那么她就会出现安全设计问题，从而激励自己进行有效的监测。事实上，设计和发行证券以达到有效的监测水平是代价高昂的，因为这既对大投资者的事前收益产生直接影响，又通过证券价格的变化对其事前收益产生间接影响。通过假设大投资者考虑了发行证券的数量对其销售收入的影响，本研究表明，最优证券是一种类似债务的证券，例如违约概率为正的标准债务，或在存在监控问题的情况下具有看涨期权的债务。此外，本研究还考察了一个风格化模型，在该模型中，公司治理结构和雇佣合同的不同组合在不同的环境参数值下继续保持稳定，在金融和劳动力制度之间存在互补关系的情况下，本研究发现两个均衡共存：一个是市场化的金融和劳动力制度的组合，另一个是主要银行和长期雇佣制度的组合。为了讨论对于不同的环境参数值，哪一种均衡更合理，本研究利用进化方法进行均衡选择。

This study develops a framework for analyzing a problem of security design in the presence of monitoring done by a large investor to discipline the management of a firm. Since the large investor enjoys only a part of the benefits brought about by her monitoring activities but incurs all the associated costs, she needs to structure the. problem of security design to motivate herself to make an efficient level of monitoring if she cannot be committed to any prior levels of monitoring before she designs and issues the security. In fact, it is costly to design and issue the security to attain an efficient level of monitoring because of both the direct effect on the ex ante payoff of the large investor and the indirect effect on her ex ante payoff through a change in the security price. By assuming that the large investor takes account of the effect on her sales revenues of the amount of security issued, this research shows that the optimal security is a debt-like security such as standard debt with a positive probability of default, or debt with call, options in the presence of the monitoring problem. Furthermore, this study also examines a stylized model in which different combinations of corporate governance structures and employment contracts continue to be stable for different parameter values of the environment, In the presence of complementarity relations between financial and labor systems, this research shows that two equilibria coexist : one is a combination of market-oriented financial and labor systems, whereas the other is a combination of the main bank and long-term employment systems. To discuss which equilibrium is more plausible for different parameter values of the environment, this study exploits the evolutionary approach to equilibrium selection.