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Financial Innovation, Securitization, and Corporate Governance

Financial Innovation, Securitization, and Corporate Governance
金融创新、证券化和公司治理
批准号:
09630009
负责人:
OSANO Hiroshi
金额:
$0.58万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份:
1997
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1997 至 1998

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
本研究开发了一个框架,用于分析在大型投资者监督公司管理的情况下的安全设计问题。由于大型投资者只享有其监测活动带来的部分利益,但却承担了所有相关成本,因此需要对其进行结构设计。如果在设计和发布安全性之前,她无法进行任何先前级别的监控,则激励自己进行有效级别的监控的安全设计问题。事实上,设计和发行证券以达到有效的监控水平是昂贵的,因为它对大投资者的事前支付有直接影响,而且通过证券价格的变化对其事前支付有间接影响。假设大投资者考虑到发行证券数量对其销售收入的影响,本研究表明,在存在监控问题的情况下,最优证券是类债务证券,如具有正违约概率的标准债券,或具有看涨期权的债券。此外,本文还考察了公司治理结构和雇佣合同的不同组合在不同环境参数值下持续稳定的风格化模型。在金融制度和劳动制度存在互补关系的情况下,两种均衡并存:一种是市场化的金融和劳动制度相结合,另一种是主银行和长期就业制度相结合。为了讨论在不同的环境参数值下哪种平衡更合理,本研究利用了平衡选择的进化方法。
英文摘要
This study develops a framework for analyzing a problem of security design in the presence of monitoring done by a large investor to discipline the management of a firm. Since the large investor enjoys only a part of the benefits brought about by her monitoring activities but incurs all the associated costs, she needs to structure the. problem of security design to motivate herself to make an efficient level of monitoring if she cannot be committed to any prior levels of monitoring before she designs and issues the security. In fact, it is costly to design and issue the security to attain an efficient level of monitoring because of both the direct effect on the ex ante payoff of the large investor and the indirect effect on her ex ante payoff through a change in the security price. By assuming that the large investor takes account of the effect on her sales revenues of the amount of security issued, this research shows that the optimal security is a debt-like security such as standard debt with a positive probability of default, or debt with call, options in the presence of the monitoring problem. Furthermore, this study also examines a stylized model in which different combinations of corporate governance structures and employment contracts continue to be stable for different parameter values of the environment, In the presence of complementarity relations between financial and labor systems, this research shows that two equilibria coexist : one is a combination of market-oriented financial and labor systems, whereas the other is a combination of the main bank and long-term employment systems. To discuss which equilibrium is more plausible for different parameter values of the environment, this study exploits the evolutionary approach to equilibrium selection.
期刊论文(4)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
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通讯作者:
Hiroshi Osano: "Default and Renegotiation in Finaucial Distress in the Multiple Bank Model: An Analysis of the Main Bank System" The Japanese Economic Review. 49. 138-157 (1998)
Hiroshi Osano:“多元银行模型中财务困境的违约与重新谈判:主要银行体系的分析”《日本经济评论》。
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Hiroshi Osano: "Secuvity Desigu, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium" European Finance Review. (forthcomimg).
Hiroshi Osano:“安全设计、内部监控和金融市场均衡”《欧洲金融评论》。
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Hiroshi Osano: "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Centructs" Journul of the Japanese and Internationel Economies. 11巻・3号. 403-436 (1997)
Hiroshi Osano:“公司治理和就业中心的演化模型”《日本和国际经济杂志》第 11 卷,第 3 期。403-436 (1997)
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Theoretical Rationality and Empirical Implications of Nonrecourse Financing
  • 批准号:
    23530217
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
  • 资助金额:
    $1.83万
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 负责人:
    OSANO Hiroshi
  • 依托单位:
Loan Contract and Risk diversification : Securitization, Syndicate Loan, and Main Bank
  • 批准号:
    20530152
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
  • 资助金额:
    $1.75万
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 负责人:
    OSANO Hiroshi
  • 依托单位:
The role of stock-based compensation and the internal control of the firm
  • 批准号:
    17530142
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
  • 资助金额:
    $1.69万
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 负责人:
    OSANO Hiroshi
  • 依托单位:
The Determination of Cross-shareholdings and the effect of Its Dissolution
  • 批准号:
    15605002
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
  • 资助金额:
    $1.73万
  • 财政年份:
    2003
  • 负责人:
    OSANO Hiroshi
  • 依托单位:
海外基金