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Financial Innovation, Securitization, and Corporate Governance

金融创新、证券化和公司治理

基本信息

批准号：
09630009
负责人：
OSANO Hiroshi
金额：
$ 0.58万
依托单位：
KYOTO UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1997
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1997 至 1998
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

This study develops a framework for analyzing a problem of security design in the presence of monitoring done by a large investor to discipline the management of a firm. Since the large investor enjoys only a part of the benefits brought about by her monitoring activities but incurs all the associated costs, she needs to structure the. problem of security design to motivate herself to make an efficient level of monitoring if she cannot be committed to any prior levels of monitoring before she designs and issues the security. In fact, it is costly to design and issue the security to attain an efficient level of monitoring because of both the direct effect on the ex ante payoff of the large investor and the indirect effect on her ex ante payoff through a change in the security price. By assuming that the large investor takes account of the effect on her sales revenues of the amount of security issued, this research shows that the optimal security is a debt-like security such as standard debt with a positive probability of default, or debt with call, options in the presence of the monitoring problem. Furthermore, this study also examines a stylized model in which different combinations of corporate governance structures and employment contracts continue to be stable for different parameter values of the environment, In the presence of complementarity relations between financial and labor systems, this research shows that two equilibria coexist : one is a combination of market-oriented financial and labor systems, whereas the other is a combination of the main bank and long-term employment systems. To discuss which equilibrium is more plausible for different parameter values of the environment, this study exploits the evolutionary approach to equilibrium selection.

本研究开发了一个框架，用于分析在大投资者对公司管理进行监督的情况下的证券设计问题。由于大投资者只享受其监督活动带来的部分收益，但承担所有相关成本，因此，她需要组织监督活动。如果在设计和发行证券之前，她不能承诺任何先前的监控级别，则安全设计问题可以激励她自己进行有效的监控级别。事实上，设计和发行证券以达到有效的监管水平是昂贵的，因为这既会直接影响大投资者的事前收益，也会通过证券价格的变化间接影响她的事前收益。通过假设大投资者考虑了证券发行量对其销售收入的影响，本文的研究表明，在存在监控问题的情况下，最优证券是债务类证券，如具有正违约概率的标准债务或具有看涨期权的债务。此外，本研究还考察了一个程式化的模型，在该模型中，公司治理结构和雇佣合同的不同组合在不同的环境参数值下继续保持稳定。在金融和劳动系统之间存在互补关系的情况下，本研究表明，两种均衡共存：一种是市场导向的金融制度和劳动制度相结合，另一种是主银行制度和长期就业制度相结合。为了讨论哪种平衡对于不同的环境参数值更合理，本研究利用进化方法来选择平衡。