Experimental psychological studies of the inductibility of responses into prosperity state in social interaction situation

“囚徒困境”是指在实验游戏情境中，每个参与者的“个体理性”动机与“群体理性”动机之间的社会冲突的典型心理状态。在相同的支付矩阵被重复表示给双方的情况下，他们常常选择非合作的备选方案，从而落入囚徒困境中的“共同贫困细胞”。玩家如何从这个牢房中脱身一直是囚徒困境研究中的重要课题之一。这两个实验研究通过集中于以下几个方面来寻找诱导玩家的反应进入繁荣细胞的具体方法：第一，“以牙还牙”策略的影响；第二，基于“复合分解博弈”的情况下，玩家的认知形式对情境中所涉及的回报结构的影响。主要研究结果如下：1)在实验I中，针锋相对的策略有几种，最优策略取决于玩家作为情境“控制者”的目的。2)为了最大化双方的共同收益，“同时以牙还牙”是最具可调性的策略。3)以个体利益最大化为目标，“以牙还牙、双重报复”是可调整的策略。(4)实验没有决定最具可调性策略的复仇放大倍数。在实验II中，1)“复合分解游戏”不能有效地诱导玩家的反应进入繁荣细胞。2)对方对指示情境结构的信息的控制是如此有效地将他的反应诱导到繁荣细胞。3)对背叛者的报复拖延并不奏效。

"Prisoner's dilemma" means a typical psychological situation involving social conflicts between the motives of the "individual rationality" and the "group rationality" for each player in the experimental game situations. In the situation where the same payoff matrix is repeatedly represented to both the two players, they used to select the non-cooperative alternatives to fall into the "mutual poverty cell" in the prisoner's dilemma. How the players can extricate from this cell has been one of the important subjects in the prisoner's dilemma studies. The two experimental studies were performed to find the concrete means to induce the player's responses into the prosperity cell by focussing to the following aspects: first, the effects of "tit-for-tat" strategies, and second, the effects of the player's cognitive form for the payoff structure which was involved in the situation based upon the "composite decomposed games". The main findings in them were as follows.In the Experiment I, 1) There were several kinds of strategies concerning the tit-for-tat, and the optimum strategy depended upon the purpose of the player as a "controller" for the situation. 2) For maximizing the joint gain between the two players, the "simultaneous tit-for-tat" was the most adjustable strategy. 3) For maximizing the individual gain, the "tit-for-tat with double revenge" was ajustable strategy. 4) The magnifying power of the revenge for the most adjustable strategy was not decided in the experiment. In the Experiment II, 1) The "composite decomposed games" were not so effective to induce the player's responses into the prosperity cell as they were. 2) The control of the information indicating the structure of situation for the other player was so effective to induce his responses into the prosperity cell. 3) The delay of revenge for the betrayer was not effective.