Strategic Behavior of Firms and Trade and Industrial Policies

本研究项目共完成三篇论文。在第一篇题为《国内和出口卡特尔的战略效应：其静态和动态分析》的文章中，我们发现，当出口需求的价格弹性相对大于内需时，允许竞争行业以一种混杂的方式形成国内或出口卡特尔可能会降低静态意义上的国家福利。但是，从国民福利的角度来看，企业承担降低成本的R&D投资的动态激励趋于过度。在第二篇题为《国际寡头垄断中的非经济目标和巴格瓦蒂的目标原则》的论文中，我们研究了当母国政府寻求一些非经济目标时，所谓的巴格瓦蒂的目标原则是否会延续到国际古诺双头垄断。最重要的发现是他的原则可以是Gen…在最后一篇题为《自愿扩大进口与政府承诺》的文章中，我们以贝特朗为例，探讨了国际寡头垄断中的自愿进口支出效应。主要的发现是，当政府预先承诺征收国内销售税或进口补贴作为VIE手段时，就会出现外国公司影响均衡的战略动机。更具体地说，当政府根据企业的定价决策选择国内销售税以实现目标进口量时，外国企业在定价上选择混合策略，由此产生的均衡就像是Ver均衡点。另一方面，当政府选择进口补贴时，并不存在平衡。较少

There are three pieces of papers whcih are completed by the present research project. In the first paper entitle "Strategic Effects of Domestic anbd Export Cartels : Their Static and Dynamic Analysis", we have found that allowing the competitive industry to form domestic or export cartels in a delberate fashion may lowser the national welfare in the static sense compared with the competitive equilibrium when the export demand is relatively more price-elastic than the domestic demand. But the industry's dynamic incentive to undertake the costreducing R&D investment tends to become excessive from the viewpoint of the natonal welfare,In the second paper entitled "Non-Economic Objectives and Bhagwati's Targeting Principle in International Oligopoly, " we studied whether the so-called Bhagwati's targetig principle carries over to international cournot duopoly when the home country's government seeks for some non-economic objective. The most important finding is that his principle can be gen … More eralized to oligopoly setting, but the second second-best optimal tax plicy subject to a non-economic objective generally requires import tariff as well as the pecuniary instruments directly affecting the target variable with more weights on the latter.In the last paper entitlte "Voluntary Import Expansion and Government Commitments", we have explored into the effects of voluntary import expnasion (VIE) in international oligopoly a la Bertrand. The major finding is that when the government cannor precommit to either domestic sales taxs or import subsidies as VIE means, then there arises the foreign firm's strategic incentive to affect the equilibirum. More specifically, when the government chooses the domestic sales taxs contingent on the firms's pricing decisions so as to achieve the target import volume, then the foreign firm chooses a mixed strategy in pricing, and the resulting equilibirium is just like the VER equilibirum. On the other hand, when the government chooses import subsidies, there exists no equilibirum. Less