Research on Corporate Strategy and Management Control for Open Innovation

通过在日本、硅谷、大伦敦等地进行的关于联合研究、技术联盟、技术信息提供者等第三方的作用等的初步实地调查，发现可以从交易成本经济学的角度分析与开放式创新过程相关的各种问题。在开放式创新的背景下，有两种类型的交易成本：“与寻找对应方有关的成本”和“与内部协调有关的成本”。为了验证这一观点，我们以日本的制造业上市公司为对象，进行了大样本的调查研究。该调查被发送到公司的研究中心和领域.我们对公司总部的“对外出售技术”和“从外部购买技术”以及领域的“从外部购买技术”相关问题进行了询问。通过大样本的调查研究，我们得到了以下结论。( ...更多信息 1)当有一个组织单位的作用是寻找对应方时，更有可能观察到“向外部出售技术”和“从外部购买技术”。我们解释说，这是因为这些组织单位有效地降低搜索成本一般。相反，与内部协调有关的费用因交易类型和组织结构类型而异。(2)当公司的域名数量增加时，“向外部出售技术”的可能性就不那么大了。这是因为在企业研究中心开发的技术的“出售或使用”决策需要与域协调，并且协调成本随着域的数量增加而增加。与这一发现相一致，“出售技术给外界”减少时，有分散的管理控制系统，域的权力相对较强。这种协调成本变得不那么具有决定性，当存在促进各领域之间共享技术信息的机制时，更有可能发生“向外部出售技术”的情况。另一方面，当企业研究中心拥有相对较强的权力时，更容易发生“向外出售技术”的技术推动型。(3)当域名数量增加时，“从外部购买技术”更有可能发生。需求拉动型的“外购技术”，反映了领域的需求，在管理控制系统分散且领域权力相对较强的情况下，更容易发生。(4)这影响了域名的“从外部购买技术”。当管理控制系统更分散时，域中“从外部购买技术”的可能性更小。少

Initial field research concerned with joint research, technology alliances, roles of third party such as technology information providers, that we conducted in Japan, Silicon Valley, and greater London, provided insights that various issues related to open innovation processes can be analyzed from a transaction cost economics perspective. In the context of open innovation, there are two types of transaction costs; those "costs associated with searching for counterpart" and those "costs associated with internal coordination". We conducted a survey research targeted at listed manufacturing companies in Japan to examine this perspective with a large sample. The survey was sent out to corporate research centers that and domains. We questioned issues related to "selling technology to outside" and "buying technology from outside" at corporate head quarter, and those related to "buying technology from outside" at domains. We obtained following findings from the large sample survey research. ( … More 1) Both "selling technology to outside" and "buying technology from outside" are more likely to be observed when there is an organizational unit whose role is to search counterpart. We interpret that this is because those organizational units effectively decrease search cost in general. On the contrary, costs associated with internal coordination differ by types of transactions and by types of organizational structures. (2) "Selling technology to outside" is less likely to happen when the number of domains in a company increases. This is because "sell or use" decision concerning the technology developed at corporate research centers requires coordination with domains, and the coordination costs increase as the number of domain increases. Consistent with this finding, "selling technology to outside" decreases when there is decentralized management control system where power of domain is relatively strong. This type of coordination costs become less decisive and it is more likely to occur that "selling technology to outside" when there exist mechanisms that facilitate sharing technological information among domains. On the other hand, it is more likely to happen that the technology push type of "selling technology to outside" when corporate research centers have relatively strong power. (3) "Buying technology from outside" is more likely to happen when the number of domains increases. The need-pull type of "buying technology from outside", which reflect needs of domains, is more likely to happen when there is decentralized management control system where domain has relatively strong power. (4) This affects "buying technology from outside" at domains. "Buying technology from outside" at domains is less likely to happen when management control system is more decentralized. Less