Empirical Analyses on the Moral Hazard Problems in the Demand andSupply of Health Care Services

在这个研究项目中，我使用了具有全国代表性的个人医疗索赔数据、医疗援助实况调查和由日本厚生劳动省在2001年至2007年进行的公共医疗保险中医疗保健活动调查，考察了公共援助制度受益人和公共医疗保险制度参保人在医疗需求和供给方面的差异。我发现，医疗供应商为受益者和参保者提供不必要的住院和门诊治疗，以回应医疗费用的降低，并且在第二个月和之后的几个月里，受益者比参保者更多地去医疗机构就诊。

In this research project, I employ the nationally representative individual medical claim data, the Fact-finding Survey on Medical Assistance and the Survey of Medical Care Activities in Public Health Insurance from 2001 to 2007, conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan and examine the differences in the demand and supply of the medical care between the beneficiaries of the Public Assistance system and the enrollees of the public health insurance systems. I find that medical suppliers provide unnecessary inpatient and outpatient treatments to the beneficiaries and enrollees in response to the medical fee reductions and that the beneficiaries more visit medical institutions than the enrollees in their second and subsequent months.