On a Survey on a Supply Chain Coordination with Information Asymmetry

在本文中，我们提供了一个建议模型的信息不对称的供应链。基于Banerjee和Sulky的模型，我们研究了信息不对称条件下讨价还价模型的经济学和管理学解释。数值算例表明，根据参数的不同，我们可以得到分离均衡或合并均衡。请注意，制定一个适当的合同结构，可以导致分离的均衡是至关重要的现代供应链管理中的战略联盟被认为是一个重要的工具，以提高战略能力。此外，由于今天的供应链已成为一个全球性的网络，包括外国公司与不同的企业文化和商业传统，这是不寻常的，企业被要求合作的其他联盟成员的不确定性。因此，一个工具来检测隐藏的信息的商业伙伴，帮助企业做出正确的管理决策。从这一点上，我们的论文可以被理解为一个有意义的初步工作，建立一个更详细的供应链模型的信息不对称。

In this paper, we provided a survey of a proposed model on supply chain with information asymmetry. Based on Banerjee’s and Sulky’s model, we investigated the economic and management interpretation of a bargaining model with information asymmetry. The numerical examples illustrates that we can obtain either a separating or pooling equilibrium depending on the parameter values. Note that formulating an adequate contract structure that can result in a separating equilibrium is critical for modern supply chain management where strategic alliance is considered an important tool to raise strategic competence. Moreover, since nowadays supply chain has become a global network including foreign firms with different corporate culture and business traditions, it is not uncommon that firms are required to corporate one another under uncertainty about the other allied members. Therefore, a tool to detect hidden information of business partner helps business make proper managerial decisions.From this point, our paper can be understood as a meaningful initial work in developing a more detailed supply chain model with information asymmetry.