Are ownership and authorship of thoughts necessary for intentionality and rationality?

已经有大量关于妄想症的性质和合理性的哲学文献，旨在确定患有妄想症的受试者的行为是否真的可以用故意的术语来描述，以及受妄想者违反了哪些理性标准。在这个项目中，我将试图推进现有的辩论，提出在精神病理学的某些情况下，受试者表现出自我认识的失败，也就是说，他们似乎并不真正支持(并能够用理由证明)他们可以通过内省获得的一些想法。让我举一个例子。你告诉我，你刚刚决定搬到埃及，而我知道你大半生都在英国生活，我问你：‘真的吗？为什么？’你回答说：‘我不知道。没有原因’。这种交流令人费解，因为一个可能会以各种方式严重影响某人生活的重要决定没有任何理由支持，因此口译人员不知道是否应该认真对待所报告的意图。有时这就是错觉中发生的事情：一个想法被报道时似乎是绝对可信的，但没有给出任何理由，或者没有任何解释人员可以识别为相关的理由。理查德·莫兰在他非常有影响力的《权威与疏远》一书中论证了理性给予和自我认识之间的联系。他声称，有理由为信仰(或决定)辩护的能力表明，主体对信仰(或决定)的内容拥有某种权威。我的项目旨在发展这种权威的概念，并探索它与自知之明程度和意向性的联系。也许错觉令人费解的是，报告错觉的人没有理由证明错觉是合理的。这可能表明，患有妄想症的受试者对他们报告的思想内容缺乏某种形式的权威。这种自知之明的崩溃并不真正影响所有妄想症受试者，也不只影响妄想症受试者，因此可能不是区分正常信念和妄想症信念的一个有希望的标准。然而，在精神病理学的哲学文献中引入权威的概念还有其他重要的应用。通过支持报告的想法，代理人形成了对自己的概念(例如，作为一个想要移居埃及的人，比如说，一种冒险感)，这一概念指导着未来的行动和决策(参见大卫·韦尔曼的自我构成概念)。自我叙述中的空白损害了这一过程，并影响了思想和行动自主性的行使。我想在这个项目中解释的正是自我认识失败的这一方面，这可能对目前对自决、自治和道德责任的分析有所贡献。

There is already an extensive philosophical literature on the nature and rationality of delusions, aimed at establishing whether the behaviour of subjects with delusions can be genuinely characterised in intentional terms and what norms ofrationality deluded subjects violate. In this project I will attempt to advance the existing debate by suggesting that in some cases of psychopathology subjects exhibit a failure of self-knowledge, that is, they do not seem to genuinely endorse (and be able to justify with reasons) some of the thoughts that they can access by introspection. Let me offer an example. You tell me that you have just decided to move to Egypt, when I know that you have lived most of your life in the UK, and I ask you: 'Really? How come?' and you reply: 'I don't know. No reason'. This exchange is puzzling because an important decision that is likely to significantly affect someone's life in a variety of ways cannot be supported by any reasons and as a result the interpreter does not know whether the reported intention should be taken seriously. Sometimes this is what happens in delusions: a thought is reported with what appears to be absolute conviction, but no reasons can be given for it, or no reasons that the interpreter can recognise as relevant.In his very influential 'Authority and Estrangement' Richard Moran argues for a connection between reason giving and self-knowledge. He claims that the capacity to justify a belief (or decision) with reasons shows that the subject has some kind of authority over the content of the belief (or decision). My project aims at developing this notion of authority and exploring its links with degrees of self-knowledge and intentionality. Maybe what is puzzling about delusions is that they are not justified with reasons by the people reporting them. This might suggest that subjects with delusions lack some form of authority over the content of the thoughts they report. This breakdown of self-knowledge does not eually affect all delusional subjects and does not affect delusional subjects alone and therefore might not be a promising criterion of demarcation between normal and delusional beliefs. However, importing the notion of authority in the philosophical literature on psychopathology has other important applications. By endorsing reported thoughts an agent forms a conception of herself (e.g. as the person who wants to move to Egypt for, say, a sense of adventure) which guides future action and decision-making (see David Velleman's notion of self-constitution). Gaps in the self-narrative impair this process and affect the exercise of autonomy in thought and action. It is this aspect of the failure of self-knowledge that I want to account for in the project and that could have a contribution to make to current analyses of self-determination, autonomy and moral responsibility.