Governance of Global Financial Markets: Institutional and Ethical Aspects

在过去的十年里，国际金融市场出现了一个无定形的、准正式的、多中心的治理体系。这包括一个由公共、准公共和私人国际机构组成的网络，以及数千项准约束性标准和规则。这些规则是以半强制性形式向国际金融界提出的，在实践中，它们的适用不受任何管辖权限制。这一治理体系最核心的部分包括基于“软法律”的国际监管制度，这些制度是由巴塞尔银行监管委员会和国际证券委员会组织(IOSCO)等监管网络实施的。此外，具有准监管责任的私营机构，如国际信用评级机构，在新兴的国际金融市场全球治理体系中发挥着重要作用。当前全球金融市场的监管模式在以下方面尤其无效：(1)协调对全球监管挑战的适当回应，例如，对新兴的大型交易所进行监管；(2)遏制国际金融危机；(3)为全球投资基金行业的运作确定适当的框架。这些弱点的部分原因是，支撑全球金融市场治理和监管的制度安排受制于政治和经济利益冲突的迷宫，部分原因是当前制度安排的混乱状态。同样重要的是，当前的治理体系几乎是在默认的情况下出现的，是环境的产物。因此，它主要是响应而不是主动地打算解决国际货币危机和银行业崩溃的紧迫问题，这些问题对跨国背景下的系统稳定构成风险。因此，它未能解决有关全球金融所希望扮演的角色的重要问题。这项研究致力于解决其中一些不足之处，并提出可行的解决方案。它主张建立一个处理全球金融市场的正式制度框架。这在很大程度上将源于将目前的半正式结构合并为一个拥有规则制定权的全球官员。这一框架的运作将在很大程度上基于(欧盟法律熟悉的)最低限度协调和相互承认的原则，使遵守商定的全球监管标准的公司、机构和市场受益于全球共同护照。此外，该研究还通过社会契约理论的视角考察了支撑全球金融市场运行的国际共识。因此，支持将这一共识视为一份隐含的全球监管契约的观点。本合同中应包括的政策目标构成了全球金融市场国际治理框架的规范性基础。在这方面，有人认为，有关的治理框架应包括两套政策目标：(A)保护储户/投资者和保护系统稳定和市场健全的主要目标，以及(B)在非常贫穷的国家实现经济发展和消除贫穷的次要目标。第二套目标的实现将始终从属于实现主要目标，并将得到国际资本充足率监管和全球投资基金许可制度中嵌入的适当设计的监管激励制度的促进。

In the past decade an amorphous, quasi-formal, and polycentric system of governance for international financial markets has emerged. This consists of a web of public, quasi-public, and private international bodies, and thousands of quasi-binding standards and rules. These rules are addressed in a semi-mandatory form to the international financial community and, in practice, their application is not subject to any jurisdictional constraints. The most central parts of this governance system comprise international regulatory regimes based on 'soft law', which are imposed by regulatory networks such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). In addition, private institutions with quasi-regulatory responsibilities, such as the International Credit Rating Agencies, play an important role in the emerging global system of governance for international financial markets. The current model of regulation for global financial markets is especially ineffective when it comes to: (1) coordinating appropriate responses to global regulatory challenges, such as, for instance, the regulation of the emerging mega- exchanges, (2) the containment of international financial crises(3) the identification of the appropriate framework for the operation of the global investment fund industry. These weaknesses are, in part, due to the fact that the institutional arrangements underlying the governance and regulation of global financial markets are subject to a maze of conflicting political and economic interests and, in part, to the messy state of current institutional arrangements. Equally important is the fact that the current governance system has emerged almost by default and is the product of circumstance. As a result, it is mostly responsive rather than proactive intending to address the pressing issues of international monetary crises and of banking collapses that pose risks to systemic stability in a transnational context. Thus, it has failed to address important questions about the desired role of global finance. This study strives to address some of these inadequacies and suggest workable solutions. It argues for the establishment of a formal institutional framework dealing with global financial markets. This would be largely derived from an amalgamation of the current semi-formal structures into a global functionary with rule-making powers. The operation of this framework would largely be based on the (familiar from EU law) principles of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition giving the benefit of a global common passport to firms, institutions, and markets complying with the agreed global regulatory standards. Furthermore, the study examines the international consensus that underpins the operation of global financial markets through the lens of social contract theory. Thus, support is lent to the argument which views this consensus as an implicit global regulatory contract. The policy objectives that should be included in this contract constitute the normative foundations of an international governance framework for global financial markets. In this context, it is argued that the relevant governance framework should encompass two sets of policy objectives: (a) the primary goals of depositor/investor protection and protection of systemic stability and of market integrity and (b) the secondary goals of economic development and poverty eradication in very poor countries. The pursuit of the second set of objectives would always be subordinate to fulfiling the principal objectives and would be facilitated by a properly devised system of regulatory incentives embedded in in international capital adequacy regulation and global investment fund licensing schemes.