Intellectual Virtue and the Good Life: Ethical and Epistemic Values

哲学家通常把“伦理学”理解为与行为有关的问题：我应该做什么，我应该如何表现，我应该如何生活？这些是关于我们“实际”生活的问题——我们作为行动的人的生活，做事的人的生活。而“认识论”则被理解为关注思维问题我应该相信什么，我应该如何推理，我能知道什么？这些都是关于我们“智力”生活的问题——我们作为思考、形成信仰和观点以及获取知识的人的生活。哲学家们——从古希腊一直到今天——都在讨论一个似乎既属于伦理学又属于认识论的观点：“智力美德”的观点。要想成功地讨论“智性美德”，就需要把这两个有时被分开的哲学研究领域结合起来。“智德”的定义本身就存在争议；哲学家们在智力美德的清单上包括了谦逊和开放等性格特征，实践智慧等技能或能力，以及感知和直觉等官能。亚里士多德在他的《尼各马可伦理学》中专门用了一章来论述智力美德，捍卫洞察力、科学理解和实践智慧对美好生活的重要性。在当代认识论中，许多人敦促对思想开放、谦逊和智力完整等性格特征进行检查。洞察力，科学的理解，实践的智慧，开放的思想，谦逊，知识的完整性——这些听起来都是好事。我的研究问题是：是什么让这些“智力美德”变得好，为什么它们有价值？我们为什么要拥有这些美德呢？是因为这些美德会让我们快乐吗？因为它能让我们成为更好的人？因为它能让我们在自由社会中成为更好的公民？或者这些美德的价值——就像一些哲学家认为的那样——是从一种特殊的“智力”或“认知”价值领域衍生出来的？许多哲学家所假设的这种价值领域的概念有意义吗？我对这些问题的研究结合了多种哲学方法。首先，要弄清楚哲学家们所说的“智力美德”是什么意思（以及曾经是什么意思），还有很多工作要做。其次，哲学伦理学中有一些值得探讨的论点，挑战了连贯性和智力完整性等美德的价值。例如，在某些情况下，不连贯是更好的——比如当你在对不同价值观的忠诚之间摇摆不定时。第三，心理学家发现，当涉及到“智力”性格特征时，个体之间存在着巨大的差异——例如，人们偏见的程度。我的项目将通过与心理学家合作，探索这些差异以及与人格和心理健康之间的潜在关联。我的部分项目旨在将我的研究成果传播给非学术受众，特别是教育工作者和教育政策制定者。关于（各级）教育的功能有一个重要的争论：它的主要功能是灌输事实或理论知识（如有时所建议的那样），还是它具有促进和发展某些有价值的性格特征、技能和能力——简而言之，智力美德——的同样重要的功能。智力美德的性质和价值与这个问题有关：例如，如果智力上的谦逊对于过一种美好的人生是必不可少的，那么在教育中培养这种美德可能是一种责任。作为我项目的一部分，我的目标是与教育家和教育哲学家接触，既可以为我的研究提供信息，也可以为那些在学院以外从事教育工作的人提供潜在有用的新框架和概念。

Philosophers typically understand "ethics" as concerned with questions about conduct: what should I do, how should I behave, how should I live? These are questions about our "practical" lives - our lives as people who act, who do things. "Epistemology," by contrast, is understood to concern questions about thought: what I should I believe, how should I reason, what can I know? These are questions about our "intellectual" lives - our lives as people who think, form beliefs and opinions, and acquire knowledge. Philosophers - going back to ancient Greece, and up to the present day - have talked about an idea that seems to belong both to ethics and to epistemology: the idea of "intellectual virtue." A successful discussion of "intellectual virtue" requires bringing these two areas of philosophical inquiry, which are sometimes kept separate, together. The definition of "intellectual virtue" itself is controversial; philosophers have included, on lists of intellectual virtues, such character traits as humility and openmindedness, skills or abilities such as practical wisdom, and faculties such as perception and intuition. Aristotle devoted a chapter of his Nicomachean Ethics to the intellectual virtues, defending the importance of insight, scientific understanding, and practical wisdom for living a good life. In contemporary epistemology, many have urged an examination of such character traits as openmindedness, humility, and intellectual integrity. Insight, scientific understanding, practical wisdom, openmindedness, humility, intellectual integrity - these all sound like good things. My research asks: what makes these "intellectual virtues" good, why are they valuable? Why should we want to have these virtues? Is it because these virtues will make us happy? Because it will make us better people? Because it will make us better citizens in a liberal society? Or does the value of these virtues derive -- as some philosophers argue -- from a special "intellectual" or "epistemic" domain of value? Does the idea of such a domain of value, assumed by many philosophers, even make sense? My approach to these questions combines a variety of philosophical methods. First, there is work to be done getting clear what philosophers mean (and have meant) by "intellectual virtue." Second, there are arguments to be explored in philosophical ethics, challenging the value of such virtues as coherence and intellectual integrity. A case can be made, for example, that there are situations where it is better to be incoherent - as when you are torn between allegiance to diverse values. Third, psychologists have found that there are substantial differences between individuals when it comes to their "intellectual" character traits - e.g. in the extent to which people are biased. My project will explore these differences and potential correlations with personality and mental health, through collaboration with psychologists. Part of my project aims to disseminate the results of my research to a non-academic audience, and in particular educators and education policymakers. There is an important debate to be had about the function of education (at all levels): whether its primary function is to instill factual or theoretical knowledge (as is sometimes suggests), or whether it has an equally important function of promoting and developing certain valuable character traits, skills, and abilities - in short, the intellectual virtues. The nature and value of the intellectual virtues is relevant to this question: if, for example, intellectual humility is essential for living a good human life, then there might be a responsibility to foster such a virtue in education. I aim to engage with educators and philosophers of education as part of my project, both to inform my research and to provide potentially useful new frameworks and concepts for those working in education outside the academy.