Converged Approach towards Resilient Industrial control systems and Cyber Assurance (CAPRICA)

在“绿色”议程的推动下，能源生产和分配正在发生根本性的变化，该议程推动增加节能，更加重视可再生能源和更复杂的需求方商业模式。英国目前有12%的能源需求由风力发电场满足。随着风力发电从邻国进口，这一比例将继续上升。例如，爱尔兰（该国50%的国内能源需求已由风力发电场满足）将在不久的将来成为风力发电的净出口国。这一市场变化的重要性不可低估，并将导致广泛的基础设施变革。风力发电本质上是突发性的，在很大程度上是不可预测的，很少发生在消费者需求最大的时候。大多数可再生能源都是如此。风力发电场通常位于人口密度低的偏远地区，并共同代表高度分布式的发电源。这与传统电网形成鲜明对比，传统电网的特点是严格分层，集中管理的碳或核能燃料发电机网络，可以准确预测需求侧需求并相应地改变其输出。电网基础设施和操作方法将发生根本性变化，以适应新的，分布式的，可再生能源发电和不断增长的产消者-同时消费和生产能源的零售客户。技术挑战是多方面的，支撑传统网格操作的许多假设正在迅速消失。能源网络运营商迫切需要新的指导和方向，以应对双重挑战：1。维持对嵌入在产消者驱动、高度连接、依赖ICT的电网基础设施中的新型高度分布式发电设施的运营控制。实施充分的控制措施，以保护电网运营免受互联网的威胁和攻击。Caprica正面应对这些挑战，并建议通过在英国唯一的大规模同步相量网络上进行实验来研究同步孤岛现象。当配电网络的地理部分与电网的其余部分电隔离时，发生孤岛。如果网络的两个部分没有正确同步，将一个孤岛重新连接到电网上可能非常危险。相位漂移是由风力或其他可再生能源驱动的自供电岛屿的可能情况。QUB EPIC团队一直致力于解决这个问题，并可以使用同步相量测量设备演示基于分布式控制架构的解决方案。同步相量在公共电信网络上运行，这会立即导致电网控制系统中的网络漏洞。操纵同步相量测量的网络攻击可能会对全国范围内的电网基础设施和消费设备造成无法估量的损害。为了应对这种风险，EPIC和CSIT研究小组已经走到一起，共同研究同步孤岛的控制和网络安全因素。通过提供电网状态和网络防御的综合视图，我们将展示改进的运营决策，面对网络攻击时提高的电网弹性，并为英国智能电网的新分布式控制架构奠定基础。

Energy production and distribution is undergoing radical change driven by a "Green" agenda pushing for increased energy conservation, greater emphasis on renewable energy sources and more sophisticated demand side business models. The UK currently has 12% of its energy requirements met by wind farms. This percentage is set to grow as wind generated electricity is imported from neighbouring countries. For example Ireland (where already 50% of domestic energy requirements are met by wind farms) will become a net exporter of wind generated electricity in the near future. The significance of this market change cannot be underestimated and will lead to broad infrastructural change. Wind generated electricity is bursty in nature, largely unpredictable and seldom occurs when consumer demand is greatest. This is true of most renewable energy sources. Wind farms are typically sited in remote areas of low population density and collectively represent a highly distributed generation source. This is in stark contrast to the traditional grid which can be characterised as a strictly hierarchical, centrally managed network of carbon or nuclear energy fuelled generators which can accurately predict demand side requirements and vary their output accordingly.Grid infrastructure and methods of operation will change radically in order to accommodate new, distributed, renewable energy generation and a growing population of prosumers - retail customers who consume and produce energy in tandem. The technical challenges are manifold and many of the assumptions underpinning traditional grid operations are rapidly dissolving. Energy network operators urgently need new guidance and direction to meet the dual challenges of:1. Maintaining operational control over new, highly distributed generation facilities embedded in a prosumer driven, highly connected, ICT dependent, grid infrastructure.2. Implementing sufficient control measures to protect grid operations from Internet borne threats and attacks.Caprica meets these challenges head on and proposes to investigate the phenomena of synchronous islanding via experimentation on the only large scale synchrophasor network available in the UK. Islanding occurs when a geographic portion of the distribution network becomes electrically isolated from the rest of the grid. Reconnecting an island back onto the grid can be very dangerous if the two portions of the network are not properly synchronised. Phase drift is a likely scenario for a self-powered island driven by wind or other renewable generation sources. The QUB EPIC team have been working on this problem and can demonstrate solutions based on a distributed control architecture using synchrophasor measurement devices. The synchrophasors operate over a public telecoms network which immediately leads to cyber vulnerabilities in the grid control system. A cyber-attack which manipulates synchrophasor measurements could cause untold damage to grid infrastructure and consumer equipment on a national scale. To counter this risk the EPIC and CSIT research groups have come together to collaboratively investigate the control and cyber security elements of synchronous islanding. By providing an integrated view of grid status and cyber defences we will demonstrate improved operational decision making, improved grid resilience in the face of cyber attack, and lay the groundwork for a new distributed control architecture for the UK smartgrid.