Leakage Aware Design Automation (LADA): Tools & Techniques for Software Crypto Implementations

通过旁路泄露信息是公认的对网络安全的威胁：尤其是众所周知，小型设备通过物理通道(功耗、电磁辐射和定时行为)泄露信息。侧通道泄漏为技术娴熟的攻击者提供了有关其他秘密内部变量的信息，这最终可能导致以密钥(或数据)恢复的形式完全破坏安全。对于具有有限复杂性的体系结构(即，少量的流水线级、很少的数据和/或地址总线)的小型嵌入式设备，可以使用诸如回归分析之类的统计工具或通过估计(多变量)正态分布来适当地对泄漏的性质进行建模。我们的研究假设是，通过利用先验推导的(指令级)泄漏模型，可以对此类设备上的新实现的泄漏行为做出有意义的声明。为了让领域知识有限的工程师能够做到这一点，从而提高他们开发的软件的质量，我们的总体目标是：基于开发出合适的指令级泄漏模型(针对设备)以及密码原语规范，我们将探索允许对相关实现进行与泄漏相关的攻击的合理评估的技术，而不需要设备齐全的侧通道实验室。

Information leakage via side channels is a widely recognised threat to cyber security: in particular small devices are known to leak information via physical channels (power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and timing behaviour). Side channel leakage provides skilled adversaries with information about otherwise secret internal variables, which can ultimately lead to complete security breaches in the form of secret key (or data) recovery. For small embedded devices, which feature architectures of limited complexity (i.e. a small number of pipeline stages, few data and/or address buses), the nature of the leakages can be appropriately modelled using statistical tools such as regression analysis or by estimating (multivariate) normal distributions. Our research hypothesis is that one can make meaningful statements about the leakage behaviour of new implementations on such devices by utilising a priori derived (instruction level) leakage models. Aiming to allow engineers with limited domain-specific knowledge to do just this, and hence improve the quality of software they develop, our overarching goal is: based on the development of a suitable instruction-level leakage model (for a device) plus specification of cryptographic primitives, we will explore techniques that allow sound assessment of leakage-related attacks on associated implementations without the need for a fully equipped side channel lab.