Currency and Fiscal Policy Options for an independent Scotland

总结本奖学金的目的是鼓励就苏格兰替代货币和财政安排的一致性进行公开和知情的辩论。这一问题是全面或进一步权力下放是否成功的核心问题。由于独立很可能是不可逆转的，至少在几年内是不可逆转的，一场明智的辩论需要理解一系列主权权利中的所有货币和财政选择，无论它们是否属于全民公投的一部分。苏格兰未来的货币和财政安排是全面或进一步权力下放成功与否的核心。英国议会拥有完全的货币、财政和政治联盟，始于1707年的《联合法》，比所有其他国家之间的货币联盟持续的时间更长。存在逻辑上不一致的货币联盟，最终总会被一场不可预见的经济冲击所暴露。历史上充斥着失败的工会不仅导致经济危机，而且往往导致政治分裂的例子。学术界有责任提出完整的货币和财政安排，并毫无歉意地强调那些不一致的安排。当前的经济危机表明，未能理解金融体系中的风险和错位的激励措施可能会破坏政策框架。过去30年全球金融危机的数量，尤其是最近的全球危机，表明了私营部门的风险如何可能变成公共部门的负债，因为政府仍是系统性风险的最终保险人。随着金融部门的风险敞口大量转移到公共部门，以前关于货币(或货币)政策和财政政策分开的可行假设已被暴露为过于简单化。在20世纪60年代形成的最优货币区的传统方法必须加以扩展，以包括金融部门的风险。只有在充分考虑金融业风险的情况下，才能判断新货币和财政安排的完整性。这项奖学金的目的是使这一延期。银行系统的负债被认为是国家的或有财政风险。这使得央行的金融监管和非货币政策(即银行支持政策)成为辩论的中心。这在货币政策和财政政策之间建立了明确的联系。这些风险是苏格兰的核心问题--苏格兰是一个拥有庞大金融部门的小型开放经济体。未能同时考虑货币、财政和金融安排将是这场辩论的严重疏漏。本文将从宏观经济和宏观金融的联合角度研究苏格兰的货币和财政政策选择。宏观经济视角着眼于独立的苏格兰经济的结构(更多地依赖于石油，没有巴尼特财政转移)和财政可持续性。该联谊会的核心是建立苏格兰首个大规模全球计量经济学模型。这将是NIESR的国家研究所全球经济模型(Nigem)的扩展，该模型拥有40多个模型订户，主要在政策界，包括英格兰银行、金融服务管理局、欧洲央行、经合组织和国际货币基金组织。宏观金融视角将把苏格兰银行体系作为一种国家或有负债加以关注。关键问题是，提供金融部门支持的制度安排(如最后贷款人和存款保险)的选择是什么，以及谁将成为监管者。尽管将这些业务外包出去是可能的，但这将涉及财政成本，并引发道德风险问题。

SUMMARYThe objective of this Fellowship is to stimulate an open and informed debate on the coherence of alternative currency and fiscal arrangements for Scotland. This issue is at the heart of whether full or further devolution will be successful. Since independence is likely to be irreversible, at least for several years, an informed debate requires understanding all of the currency and fiscal options across a spectrum of sovereignty rights, whether or not they are part of a referendum. Scotland's future currency and fiscal arrangement is at the heart of whether full or further devolution will be successful. The Parliament of Great Britain with full currency, fiscal and political union began with the Acts of Union in 1707 and has endured longer that all other monetary unions between nations. Monetary unions which have logical inconsistencies have always been eventually exposed by an unforeseeable economic shock. History is replete with instances in which failed unions lead not only to economic crises but often political division. The academic community has a responsibility to propose currency and fiscal arrangements which have integrity and be unapologetic in highlighting those which are inconsistent.The current economic crisis shows how failure to understand risks and misaligned incentives in the financial system can undermine policy frameworks. The number of financial crises around the world over the last three decades, and in particular the recent global crisis, shows how private sector risks can become public sector liabilities as the state remains the ultimate insurer of systemic risk. With the large transfer of financial sector exposures to the public sector the previous working assumption of a division between currency (or monetary) policy and fiscal policy has become exposed as an over-simplification.The traditional approach of an optimal currency area developed in the 1960s must be extended to include financial sector risks. Only when financial sector risks are fully incorporated can the integrity of the new currency and fiscal arrangements be judged. This Fellowship aims to make this extension. The liabilities of the banking system are assumed to be contingent fiscal risks of the state. This brings financial supervision and non-monetary policies (i.e. bank support policies) by the central bank into the centre of the debate. This creates a clear link between monetary and fiscal policies. These risks are central to Scotland - a small and open economy with a large financial sector. Failure to consider currency, fiscal and financial arrangements together would be a serious omission in this debate.This Fellowship will examine Scotland's currency and fiscal policy options from a joint macro-economic and macro-financial perspective. The macro-economic perspective looks at the structure of an independent Scottish economy (more oil-based and without the Barnett fiscal transfer) and fiscal sustainability. The core of the Fellowship is building the first large-scale global econometric model of Scotland. This will be an extension of NIESR's National Institute Global Economic Model (NiGEM) which has over 40 model subscribers, mainly in the policy community, including the Bank of England, the FSA, the ECB, the OECD, the IMF. The macro-financial perspective will focus on the Scottish banking system as a state contingent liability. The key issues are what are the choices of institutional arrangements for providing financial sector support (such as lender of last resort and deposit insurance) and who will be the regulator. While it is possible to contract-out these operations, this will involve a fiscal cost and raise moral hazard issues.