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Reconciling Emotions and Virtue: Towards a New Humean Virtue Ethics

Reconciling Emotions and Virtue: Towards a New Humean Virtue Ethics
调和情感与美德:迈向新休谟美德伦理
批准号:
2454413
负责人:
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
英国
项目类别:
Studentship
财政年份:
2020
资助国家:
英国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2020 至 --

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中文摘要
翻译
情绪会对道德行为构成威胁吗?尽管许多哲学家都持这种立场,但苏格兰启蒙运动哲学家大卫·休谟(1711-1776)是这种倾向的一个例外。我的项目研究休谟如何整合情感和美德,即稳定的性格特征,在他的道德哲学,并提供了第一个详细和系统的建设基于情感的美德伦理学。这种观点具有很大的潜力,因为它认真对待情绪(包括负面情绪)在我们的个人生活和社会中发挥着重要作用。与其他几种道德理论不同的是,情绪是人类繁荣的核心。我的项目旨在(A)对休谟关于消极激情及其道德影响的描述进行首次全面研究;(B)在我对休谟哲学的原始解释的启发下,发展一种新的基于情绪的美德伦理学。该项目分为两个部分,对应于两个目标:第一部分侧重于休谟的哲学解释。核心研究问题是:休谟如何在他基于情感的伦理体系中调和消极情感和美德?第二部分着重于我对休谟的原创性阐释所启发的伦理学新体系的构建。中心研究问题是:如何才能使休谟的情感为基础的元伦理框架与美德伦理道德理论相一致?
英文摘要
Are emotions a threat to virtuous behaviour? Although many philosophers have held this position, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) is an exception to this tendency. My project examines how Hume integrates emotions and virtues, namely stable character traits, in his moral philosophy and offers the first detailed and systematic construction of an emotion-based virtue ethics. Such a view has major potential, because it takes seriously that emotions (including negative ones) play an important role in our individual lives and in society. Rather than suppressing emotions, as several other moral theories do, emotions are central for human flourishing.My project aims (A) to offer the first comprehensive study of Hume's account of negative passions and their moral impact; and (B) to develop a novel emotion-based virtue ethics inspired by my original interpretation of Hume's philosophy. The project is divided into two parts, corresponding to the two aims:Part-A focuses on the interpretation of Hume's philosophy. The central research question is: How does Hume reconcile negative emotions and virtue within his emotion-based ethical system?Part-B focuses on the construction of a new system of ethics inspired by my original interpretation of Hume. The central research question is: How can a Humean emotion-based metaethical framework be made consistent with virtue ethical moral theories?
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