The System and Its Progeny: Stirner's Insurrectionary Hegelianism and the Affirmation of Creative Individuality

黑格尔的哲学，就其作为教学工具的本质而言，试图产生一种新的主体性，这种主体性与其在其哲学体系的“绝对知识”中教育读者的目标相一致。在追求他们自己的这种知识的版本，黑格尔的几个最具创新性的追随者寻找一个适当的连贯的“后系统”的经验和实践的主题。我的研究的核心论点是，黑格尔以前的学生马克斯·施蒂纳（Max Stirner，1806-1856）提出的主体性模型最好地模拟了黑格尔哲学教育最终产生的那种主体性。施蒂纳把个体主体说成是“创造性的虚无”，其解放在于完全自觉地肯定其内在的灵活性和创造力--这种创造力与作为个体核心的否定性密不可分。施蒂纳的这一理论丰富了黑格尔的主体性可塑性理论，并将其重新定位为解放性实践。正是通过对黑格尔的生产理论的阐述，结合他关于主体的可塑性与否定的生产力的关系的理论，我将援引施蒂纳作为主体的模型，这种主体肯定自己具有这种可塑性和这种力量。重新主张施蒂纳的主体性是黑格尔体系的必然产物，其后果是对当代黑格尔学术中相当缺乏施蒂纳思想的情况提出质疑，并试图开始施蒂纳学术复兴领域与当代黑格尔理论之间的对话。这个“对话”将试图融合施蒂纳的个人理论的概念分析，并在施蒂纳奖学金与当代黑格尔奖学金，旨在借鉴黑格尔的系统解放的目的内解放。

Hegel's philosophy, by its own nature as a pedagogical tool, sought to produce a new kind of subjectivity consistent with its goal of educating its readers in the 'Absolute Knowledge' of its philosophical system. In pursuit of their own versions of such knowledge, several of Hegel's most innovative followers searched for a suitably coherent 'post-systemic' subject of experience and practice. The core argument of my research is that the model of subjectivity proposed by Max Stirner (1806-1856), a former student of Hegel, best models the kind of subjectivity that the education of Hegelian philosophy ultimately produces. I argue that Stirner's theory individual subject as the 'creative nothing', whose emancipation consists in the fully self-conscious affirmation of their inherent flexibility and creative power-a power inseparable from the negativity at the core of individuality as such-exemplifies Hegel's theory of the plasticity of subjectivity and re-orients it towards emancipatory practice For Hegel, subjectivity is both inherently negative yet also inherently productive; and it is through an exposition of Hegel's theory of production, in conjunction with his theory of the plasticity of the subject in relation to this productive power of the negative, that I'll invoke Stirner as a model for the kind of subject that affirms itself to have this plasticity as well as this power. The reassertion of Stirnerian subjectivity as a necessary product of Hegel's system will have the consequence of calling into question the considerable absence of engagement with Stirner's thought in contemporary Hegel scholarship, and seeks to begin a conversation between the resurgent field of Stirner scholarship and contemporary Hegelian theory. This 'conversation' will attempt to fuse the conceptual analysis of Stirner's theory of the individual and its emancipation within Stirner scholarship with contemporary Hegel scholarship that seeks to draw on Hegel's system for emancipatory ends.