Formalise results in algebra and cryptography, and develop a unified theory of end-to-end security for web applications

形式化代数和密码学的结果，并为Web应用程序开发端到端安全的统一理论，结合可证明正确的密码学和基于语言的信息流安全。使用Isabelle proof assistant为场论中的高级结果开发正式的数学库。实例化其中的一些结果来证明密码协议。尝试在伊莎贝尔开发信息流安全的一般理论，可用于提供正式的端到端的保证，以基于Web的系统。例如，他的理论将允许结合联合收割机（1）在网络层的互联网通信中使用的加密协议的可证明的安全性与（2）在服务器上的应用层建立的正式信息流安全保证，以获得整个基于Web的系统的端到端安全保证（从最终用户的角度来看）。这种程度的统一是一个雄心勃勃的目标，以前从未尝试过。如果没有这样一个统一的观点，互联网安全的格局目前是支离破碎的，给最终用户留下了很多不确定性。

Formalise results in algebra and cryptography, and develop a unified theory of end-to-end security for web applications, combining provably correct cryptography and language-based information flow security. Use the Isabelle proof assistant to develop formal mathematical libraries for advanced results in field theory. Instantiate some of these results to certify cryptographic protocols. Attempt to develop in Isabelle a general theory of information flow security that can be used to provide formal end-to-end guarantees to web-based systems. For example, his theory will allow to combine (1) the provable security of cryptographic protocols used in internet communication at the network layer with (2) formal information flow security guarantees established at the application layer on the server, to obtain an end-to-end security guarantee for the web-based system as whole (from the end user's perspective). This degree of unification is an ambitious aim that has not been attempted before. Without such a unified view, the landscape of internet security is currently fragmented, leaving a lot of uncertainty for the end users.