The Agents of Justice: Towards a Liberal-Egalitarian Theory of Political Agency

一种普遍的观点认为，正义理论化的最终目的--实际上，政治哲学的最终目的--是影响现实世界的政治行为。正如大卫米勒所说：“我的出发点是这样一个假设，即政治哲学是实践理性的一个分支--思想的最终目的是指导行动，而不是仅仅具有投机目的”（2013年，第34页）。最近，一些批评家认为，关于正义的理论通常无法实现政治哲学的“行动指导”愿景。对于这些批评者（称他们为“代理人主义者”）来说，这种失败源于正义理论家对一个至关重要的问题的忽视：他们的理论应该指导谁的行动。根据这种观点，这些理论家未能充分阐明正义的代理人：这些代理人的任务是在现实世界的政治环境中实现他们所青睐的正义原则（奥尼尔，2001）。在哲学博士论文的第一部分，我试图回答三个主要问题，这个新生的“代理转向”在当代司法文献（Ghazavi，2023年，第3页）。第一个问题是解释性的：在现有的挑选正义代理人的尝试中，代理人主义者到底反对什么？此外，是否有某种东西统一了行动主义者的抱怨，或者行动主义转向仅仅由零碎的反对意见组成？第二是评价性：代理人主义者的主张有多可信？他们在多大程度上威胁到了政治哲学家目前思考正义的方式？第三个问题是规范性的：如果代理人主义者的主张被证明是有充分根据的，那么正义理论家如何做出最好的回应？他们是否可以采取一些做法，以减轻这些忧虑？在以前的工作的基础上，我开始重建两个不同的参数从“代理转向”。前者，我称之为主体多元主义，认为正义的理论家，在狭隘地固定在国家的角色作为一个公正的代理人，没有意识到的多元化的行为者可能是至关重要的公正代理人。后者，我称之为代理人内在主义，认为正义理论家没有足够注意到在未来的正义代理人内部获得的动态。完成了这一重要的劳动不足，我声称，代理多元化和代理内部主义提出了严重的问题，正义的理论家。在此之后，我转向正义理论家如何最好地回应这些担忧的问题。我建议，正义理论家开始通过识别现实世界的政治代理人实现正义的能力-一个过程，可能涉及理论家进入该领域本身，如贝尔纳多Zacka（2017）先锋民族志研究前线公务员。在这样做之后，这些理论家可以回到更熟悉的规范领域，调查未来的正义代理人被允许和有义务利用他们的能力来实现正义的方式。在博士论文的第二部分，我将把这种方法应用于各种潜在的正义代理人，如政党，国家官僚机构，非政府组织（NGO），在哲学博士论文的最后一部分，我转向内部，重新审视政治哲学的实践。关于正义的理论总是发生在专业学者阅读的书籍和期刊文章中，很少有理论家直接将他们的发现传达给潜在的正义代理人。这是一个问题吗？如果是，如何补救？此外，我们是否应该将政治哲学家本身视为正义的潜在代理人？如果是这样，这与他们的理论有什么关系？

On a widely held view, the ultimate purpose of theorising about justice - indeed, of doing political philosophy at all - is to influence real-world political behaviour. As David Miller puts it: 'I start from the assumption that political philosophy is a branch of practical reason - it is thought whose final aim is to guide action, as opposed to having a merely speculative purpose' (2013, p.34). As of late, a number of critics have argued that theorising about justice habitually fails to live up to this 'action-guiding' vision of political philosophy. For these critics (call them 'agentialists'), this failure stems from the neglect that theorists of justice have shown to a vital matter: the question of whose actions their theorising is supposed to guide. On this view, these theorists have failed to adequately spell out the agents of justice: those agents tasked with realising their favoured principles of justice in real-world political circumstances (O'Neill, 2001). In the first part of the DPhil thesis, I seek to answer three main questions about this nascent 'agential turn' within the contemporary justice literature (Ghazavi, 2023, p.3). The first is interpretative: What is it exactly that agentialists object to in existing attempts to pick out agents of justice? Moreover, is there something which unifies the agentialists' complaints, or does the agential turn consist solely of piecemeal objections? The second is evaluative: How plausible are the agentialists' claims, and to what extent do they threaten the ways in which political philosophers currently think about justice?The third is prescriptive: If the agentialists' claims are shown to be well-founded, how might theorists of justice best respond? Are there certain practices they can adopt in order to mitigate these worries? Building on previous work, I begin by reconstructing two distinct arguments from within the 'agential turn'. The former, which I call agent-pluralism, contends that theorists of justice, in narrowly fixating on the state's role as an agent of justice, have failed to appreciate the plurality of actors who might be crucial agents of justice. The latter, which I call agent-internalism, holds that theorists of justice have not been attentive enough to the dynamics that obtain within prospective agents of justice. Having performed this vital under-labour, I claim that both agent-pluralism and agent-internalism raise serious questions for theorists of justice. After this, I turn to the question of how theorists of justice might best respond to these worries. I suggest that theorists of justice begin by identifying real-world political agents with capabilities to realise justice - a process that may involve theorists entering the field themselves, as illustrated by Bernardo Zacka's (2017) pioneering ethnographic study of frontline public servants. Having done so, these theorists can return to more familiar normative terrain, investigating the ways in which prospective agents of justice are both permitted and obligated to employ their capabilities to realise justice.In the second part of the DPhil thesis, I will apply this method to a variety of potential agents of justice, such as political parties, state bureaucracies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and international governmental institutions (IGOs).In the final part of the DPhil thesis, I turn inward to re-examine the practice of political philosophy. Theorising about justice invariably takes place in books and journal articles read exclusively by professional academics, with few theorists directly communicating their findings to potential agents of justice. Is this a problem and, if so, how might it be remedied? Moreover, should we consider political philosophers themselves to be potential agents of justice? If so, how might this bear on their theorising?