Secure Telecommunication Infrastructures - Mechanisms to mitigate the impacts of non-cooperative participants in distributed systems

我为人人，人人为我。分布式系统通常由独立的参与者组成，他们必须为了自己的利益而相互协作。如果参与者之间没有强有力的合作，这些系统将是无效的。不幸的是，参与者合法合作，恶意行为或自私行为。例如，在移动自组织网络中，参与者可能必须转发来自其他参与者的流量。因此，自私的参与者可以被视为被动的参与者，他们从其他人那里获取一些网络服务，而不提供任何这样的服务。这些参与者可能对这种网络的性能产生重大影响。最终，合法的参与者可能无法正常通信。

One for all, all for one. Distributed systems are generally composed of independent participants who have to collaborate with each other for their own benefit. Without a strong cooperation among the participants, these systems would be ineffective. Unfortunately, participants cooperate legitimately, act maliciously or behave selfishly. For example, in mobile ad hoc networks, the participants may have to forward traffic flows from others. Thus, selfish participants can be seen as passive participants who retrieve some network services from others without providing back any such service. These participants can have major impacts on the performance of such a network. Ultimately, legitimate participants may not be able to communicate properly. Without any incentive mechanism, selfish participants would behave for their own benefit without any regard for others. Traditionally, game theory has been used to model incentive mechanisms to reward legitimate participants with a faked currency. Repeated non-cooperative game approaches can also be used to force selfish participants to collaborate under the threat of potential retaliation. Unfortunately, traditional approaches assume that cooperative participants can always collaborate truthfully. They cannot cope easily with stochastic participants who are unfortunately unable to collaborate momentarily. Similarly, traditional approaches assume that cooperative and uncooperative participants can always be distinguished without any error. If a participant misidentifies another participant, this latter participant may be facing unjustifiable retaliations. This research program would investigate how to adapt the classical approaches of game theory (i) to allow the presence of stochastic cooperative participants and (ii) to cope with misidentification of the cooperative/uncooperative participants.