"Dissociating belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall within autobiographical memory: Conceptual refinement and experimental manipulation"

很多时候，回忆过去的事情和相信过去发生的事情是同时发生的。记忆通常是被相信的，而自传体回忆的研究通常是对相信的记忆的研究。然而，最近的研究表明，自传性信仰可以在没有回忆的情况下发生。对错误记忆和非记忆自传性事件的研究表明，自传性信念经常发生在缺乏记忆的情况下。对不相信的记忆的研究表明，回忆也可以超过相信。其他理论和研究表明，回忆和对回忆准确性的信念(通过自信)在概念上也是不同的。然而，对发生的信念、回忆和对回忆的信心尚未从理论和经验上同时加以区分。这项研究计划将，1)测试结构模型，其中对发生的信念、回忆和对回忆的信心被理论化，以代表不同的潜在变量，使用已开发的适当的事件线索方法；2)在实验室中实验地创建和操纵非相信的记忆；以及3)第一次对发生信念和回忆之间的区别进行探索性的神经成像研究。总而言之，这些研究将确立对发生、回忆和回忆信心的区分信念在多大程度上挑战了先前对自传体记忆结构和功能的概念化。研究中的这些过程之间的分离可能会导致修正关于当人们表示他们在记忆时到底报告了什么的理论。如果提出的分离通过这项研究出现，既定的记忆方法可能需要修改，以适应对事件发生真相的评估与记忆类心理模拟的存在之间的区别，记忆类心理模拟可能会或可能不会导致过去发生的事件。

Much of the time, recollecting events and believing that events occurred in the past happen together. Memories are typically believed, and the study of autobiographical recollection is often the study of believed memories. Yet recent work shows that autobiographical belief can occur without recollection. Work on false memories and non-remembered autobiographical events shows that autobiographical beliefs frequently occur in the absence of memory. Research on non-believed memories, memories that were formerly but are no longer believed, shows that recollection can also exceed belief. Other theory and research shows that recollection and belief in the accuracy of recall (via confidence) are also conceptually distinct. However, belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall have yet to be theoretically and empirically distinguished simultaneously. This research program will, 1) test structural models in which belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recollection are theorized to represent distinct latent variables, using appropriate event cueing methods that are developed; 2) experimentally create and manipulate non-believed memories in the laboratory; and 3) conduct the first exploratory neuroimaging study of the distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection. Cumulatively, these studies will establish the degree to which distinguishing belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in reollection challenges previous conceptualizations of the structure and function of autobiographical memory. Dissociations between processes such as those under investigation may lead to revisions of theories about exactly what is being reported when people indicated that they are remembering. Should the proposed dissociations emerge through this research, established approaches to memory may require revision in order to accommodate the distinction between evaluations of the truth of event occurrence versus the presence of memory-like mental simulations that may or may not indiate events happened in the past.