A differential game approach to dynamic optimal control strategies for watershed pollution across regional boundaries under eco-compensation criterion
A differential game approach to dynamic optimal control strategies for watershed pollution across regional boundaries under eco-compensation criterion
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生态补偿准则下跨区域流域污染动态最优控制策略的微分博弈方法
DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolind.2019.05.065
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发表时间：
2019-10
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Shi Shasha
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang Ke;You Daming;Li Zhendong;Shi Shasha
近年来，以流域污染为代表的跨界污染层出不穷，表现为流域间单向或交叉的外溢现象。这种污染严重影响了我国实现区域可持续协调发展的内在要求。通过引入生态补偿准则，建立了连续时间内上下游跨区域边界污染减排微分博弈模型。随后，采用最优控制理论，以流域福利净现值最大化为目标，探讨了Stackelberg契约和合作博弈契约下流域整体环境质量的最优反馈均衡。最后，以湖南湘江流域为例，验证了模型的有效性，并得出以下结论：（1）流域环境退化成本因子和收益因子对上下游排污能力有显著影响;（2）受上游污染物存量和污染转移系数的影响，下游污染物存量的最优轨迹高于上游;（3）生态补偿标准的设置能有效激励上游政府加大对环境友好型技术的投资;（4）博弈双方的联合决策提高了流域区域的总体福利水平。研究结果提出了一个有效的方法，解决跨区域边界的水污染冲突的环境政策的设计。
In recent years, transboundary pollution reflected by watershed pollution has emerged in an endless stream, manifesting as the overflow phenomenon of one-way or crossing between river basins. Such pollution significantly seriously affects the inherent requirements for achieving regional sustainable and coordinated development in China. By introducing the eco-compensation criterion, a cross-regional boundaries pollution abatement differential game model covering upstream and downstream regions in a continuous time is established. Subsequently, the optimal control theory is adopted by maximizing the net present value of river basin welfare to explore relevant optimal feedback equilibriums on the overall watershed environmental quality under the Stackelberg and cooperative game contracts. Eventually, a case study of Xiang Jiang River Basin (XJRB) in Hunan Province of China serves to verify the practicable effectiveness of the foregoing model combined with numerical simulation and support key insights as below: (i) the watershed environmental degradation cost factor as well as the payoff factor possess significant impact on emission capacities of upstream and downstream; (ii) the optimal trajectory of pollutant stock in the downstream affected by the upstream pollutant stock and pollution transfer coefficient is higher than that in the upstream; (iii) the setting of eco-compensation criterion can effectively stimulate upstream governments to invest more in environmentally friendly technologies; and (iv) the joint decisions of the two game parties improve the total welfare level of both river basin regions. Findings present an efficient approach for the design of environmental policies addressing conflicts over water pollution across regional boundaries.
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影响因子：
6.9
作者：
Wu Zening;Guo Xi;Lv Cuimei;Wang Huiliang;Di Danyang
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DOI：
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