An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment.
An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment.
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通过自然实验对中国大学招生改革进行实证评价
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.2009282117
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发表时间：
2020-12-15
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Kesten O
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen Y;Jiang M;Kesten O
虽然大学录取决定影响着每年数百万学生的教育经历和劳动力市场的结果，但决定录取的最佳方法一直受到地球仪的学者和政策制定者的热烈讨论。推动这场辩论的是过去20年来的一些重大理论和实践创新。我们使用来自中国的一个自然实验，评估了在中国的大学录取和在美国的学校选择中使用多年的立即录取机制以及较新的平行机制的性能。我们发现，当各省转向平行机制时，学生会申请更多的大学，并首先列出更有声望的大学。我们进一步发现学生与大学的匹配变得更加稳定。大学招生政策每年影响数百万学生的教育经历和劳动力市场结果。仅在中国，每年就有1000万高中毕业生参加全国高考，争夺各个大学的700万个席位，这一体系成为世界上最大的集中匹配市场。在过去的20年里，中国大学招生制度发生了根本性的改革，许多省份从顺序（立即录取）机制转向某种形式的平行大学录取机制，即立即录取和延期录取机制的混合体。在这项研究中，我们使用一个自然的实验，以评估的有效性的顺序和并行机制，在激励学生的大学排名策略，并提供稳定的匹配结果。我们使用了一个在2008年和2009年之间实施了部分改革的省份的独特数据集，我们发现，在该省在其一级大学录取过程中采用平行机制后，学生在他们的排名顺序列表中列出了更多的大学，并将更有声望的大学作为他们的首选。这些列表策略反过来又导致匹配结果的更大稳定性，与我们的理论预测一致，即并行机制比顺序机制更难操作且更稳定。
Significance While college admission decisions impact the educational experiences and labor market outcomes for millions of students each year, the best method to determine admissions has been vigorously debated by academics and policymakers across the globe. Driving this debate are a number of major theoretical and practical innovations over the past 2 decades. Using a natural experiment from China, we evaluate the performance of the immediate acceptance mechanism, used for many years for college admissions in China and school choice in the United States, and the newer parallel mechanism. We find that when provinces move to the parallel mechanism, students apply to more colleges and list more prestigious colleges first. We further find that the student–college matchings become more stable. College admissions policies affect the educational experiences and labor market outcomes for millions of students each year. In China alone, 10 million high school seniors participate in the National College Entrance Examination to compete for 7 million seats at various universities each year, making this system the largest centralized matching market in the world. The last 20 y have witnessed radical reforms in the Chinese college admissions system, with many provinces moving from a sequential (immediate acceptance) mechanism to some version of the parallel college admissions mechanism, a hybrid between the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms. In this study, we use a natural experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of the sequential and parallel mechanisms in motivating student college ranking strategies and providing stable matching outcomes. Using a unique dataset from a province that implemented a partial reform between 2008 and 2009, we find that students list more colleges in their rank-ordered lists, and more prestigious colleges as their top choices, after the province adopts the parallel mechanism in its tier 1 college admissions process. These listing strategies in turn lead to greater stability in matching outcomes, consistent with our theoretical prediction that the parallel mechanism is less manipulable and more stable than the sequential mechanism.
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