Strategy selection in structured populations.
Strategy selection in structured populations.
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035
复制
发表时间：
2009-08-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tarnita, Corina E.;Ohtsuki, Hisashi;Antal, Tibor;Fu, Feng;Nowak, Martin A.
进化博弈论研究频率依赖选择。策略的适应度不是常数，而是取决于策略在种群中的相对频率。这种类型的进化动力学发生在生态学、传染病动力学、动物行为和人类社会互动的许多环境中。传统上，演化博弈动力学是在混合种群中研究的，其中任何两个个体之间的相互作用都是同等可能的。也有几种方法来研究结构化群体中的进化博弈。在本文中，我们提出了一个简单的结果，适用于各种各样的人口结构。我们考虑两个策略A和B之间的博弈，用支付矩阵来描述。我们研究的是突变和选择过程。如果收益在a，B，c，d中是线性的，则对于弱选择策略A优于B当且仅当σa + B > c + σd。这意味着种群结构对策略选择的影响可以用一个参数σ来描述。我们给出了各种例子的σ值，包括混合种群，图上的游戏和表型空间中的游戏。我们给出了这样一个σ的存在性的证明，它适用于所有具有某些（自然）性质的种群结构和更新规则。我们假设弱选择，但允许任何突变率。我们讨论了σ和合作演化的临界效益成本比之间的关系。单个参数σ允许我们量化种群结构促进合作进化或在协调博弈中选择有效均衡的能力。
Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix . We study a mutation and selection process. If the payoffs are linear in a, b, c, d, then for weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if σa + b > c + σd. This means the effect of population structure on strategy selection can be described by a single parameter, σ. We present the values of σ for various examples including the well-mixed population, games on graphs and games in phenotype space. We give a proof for the existence of such a σ, which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain (natural) properties. We assume weak selection, but allow any mutation rate. We discuss the relationship between σ and the critical benefit to cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. The single parameter, σ, allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose efficient equilibria in coordination games.
登录
查看更多内容
影响因子：
2
作者：
Antal, Tibor;Nowak, Martin A.;Traulsen, Arne
通讯作者：
Traulsen, Arne
影响因子：
2.9
作者：
Ferriere, R;Michod, RE
通讯作者：
Michod, RE
影响因子：
3.1
作者：
Fogel, GB;Andrews, PC;Fogel, DB
通讯作者：
Fogel, DB
影响因子：
56.9
作者：
AXELROD, R;HAMILTON, WD
通讯作者：
HAMILTON, WD
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ELLISON, G
通讯作者：
ELLISON, G