The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games.
The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games.
复制标题
DOI：
10.1038/ncomms1442
复制
发表时间：
2011-08-16
影响因子：
16.6
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rand, David G.;Nowak, Martin A.
合作是自然界和人类社会的基本组成部分，在这种合作中，一个人需要付出代价来帮助另一个人。有人认为，代价高昂的惩罚可以促进合作的发展，惩罚的威胁可以阻止搭便车者。然而，最近的实验揭示了“反社会”惩罚的存在，即不合作的人惩罚合作的人。虽然各种理论模型都发现惩罚可以促进合作的进化，但这些模型先验地排除了反社会惩罚的可能性。本文将可选公共产品博弈的标准理论扩展到包括全套惩罚策略。我们发现惩罚不再增加合作，选择倾向于大量的反社会惩罚。此外，我们进行行为实验，其结果与我们的模型预测一致。与促进合作的利他行为相反，惩罚主要是一种保护自己免受潜在竞争对手侵害的自利工具。
Cooperation, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a fundamental building block of the natural world and of human society. It has been suggested that costly punishment can promote the evolution of cooperation, with the threat of punishment deterring free-riders. Recent experiments, however, have revealed the existence of ‘anti-social’ punishment, where non-cooperators punish cooperators. While various theoretical models find that punishment can promote the evolution of cooperation, these models a priori exclude the possibility of anti-social punishment. Here we extend the standard theory of optional public goods games to include the full set of punishment strategies. We find that punishment no longer increases cooperation, and that selection favors substantial levels of anti-social punishment for a wide range of parameters. Furthermore, we conduct behavioral experiments, which lead to results that are consistent with our model predictions. As opposed to an altruistic act that promotes cooperation, punishment is mostly a self-interested tool for protecting oneself against potential competitors.
登录
查看更多内容
影响因子：
5.1
作者：
Ellingsen, Tore;Johannesson, Magnus
通讯作者：
Johannesson, Magnus
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0811503106
发表时间：
2009-03-10
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Helbing, Dirk;Yu, Wenjian
通讯作者：
Yu, Wenjian
影响因子：
2.3
作者：
Cinyabuguma, Matthias;Page, Talbot;Putterman, Louis
通讯作者：
Putterman, Louis
影响因子：
2
作者：
Janssen, Marco A.;Bushman, Clint
通讯作者：
Bushman, Clint
影响因子：
1.3
作者：
Denant-Boemont, Laurent;Masclet, David;Noussair, Charles N.
通讯作者：
Noussair, Charles N.