Fitness Trade-offs Result in the Illusion of Social Success.
Fitness Trade-offs Result in the Illusion of Social Success.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cub.2015.02.061
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发表时间：
2015-04-20
期刊：
影响因子：
9.2
通讯作者：
Thompson, Christopher R. L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wolf, Jason B.;Howie, Jennifer A.;Parkinson, Katie;Gruenheit, Nicole;Melo, Diogo;Rozen, Daniel;Thompson, Christopher R. L.
从简单的微生物到复杂的动物社会系统，合作在生命之树中无处不在。个体通过参与代价高昂的行为进行合作，这些行为可以被其他个体利用，而其他个体则通过避免这些相关成本而受益。因此，如果在合作互动过程中成功利用社会伙伴增加了相对适应度，那么我们预计选择会导致出现一个单一的最佳获胜策略，在这个策略中，个人最大限度地从合作中获得收益，同时最小化相关成本。这种社会“欺骗”似乎在自然界中广泛存在，包括在几个微生物系统中，但尽管有利于社会欺骗的适应性优势，人口往往在社会成功方面存在显着差异，而不是单一的最佳获胜策略。使用社会变形虫Dictyosteelium discoideum，我们提供了一个可能的解释这种变化的共存。我们发现，基因型通常被称为“骗子”，因为他们产生了不成比例的孢子在嵌合子实体实际上并没有获得更高的健身作为这一明显的优势，因为他们产生更小，更少的孢子比推定的“失败者”。作为孢子数量和生存能力之间的这种权衡的结果，具有不同孢子生产策略的基因型，其给出了差异社会成功的外观，最终具有类似的实现的适应性。这些发现突出了在进化研究中使用单一适应性代理的局限性，并表明，用欺骗或合作等策略来解释社会特质变异可能会产生误导，除非这些行为被认为是在真正的多维适应性的背景下。“骗子”基因型产生较小的孢子，降低生存能力“失败者”投资于较大的孢子，具有较高的生存能力数量/生存能力的权衡意味着不同的社会策略具有相似的适应性作弊可能是虚幻的，除非在多维适应性的背景下观察如果利用社会伙伴增加适应性，那么选择应该有利于一个最佳的获胜策略。然而，作弊者和失败者往往共存。在这里，沃尔夫等人。表明，不同的社会策略可以共存于社会变形虫D. discoideum由于社会特征之间的权衡，这意味着简单的作弊观点可能是虚幻的。
Cooperation is ubiquitous across the tree of life, from simple microbes to the complex social systems of animals. Individuals cooperate by engaging in costly behaviors that can be exploited by other individuals who benefit by avoiding these associated costs. Thus, if successful exploitation of social partners during cooperative interactions increases relative fitness, then we expect selection to lead to the emergence of a single optimal winning strategy in which individuals maximize their gain from cooperation while minimizing their associated costs. Such social “cheating” appears to be widespread in nature, including in several microbial systems, but despite the fitness advantages favoring social cheating, populations tend to harbor significant variation in social success rather than a single optimal winning strategy. Using the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, we provide a possible explanation for the coexistence of such variation. We find that genotypes typically designated as “cheaters” because they produce a disproportionate number of spores in chimeric fruiting bodies do not actually gain higher fitness as a result of this apparent advantage because they produce smaller, less viable spores than putative “losers.” As a consequence of this trade-off between spore number and viability, genotypes with different spore production strategies, which give the appearance of differential social success, ultimately have similar realized fitness. These findings highlight the limitations of using single fitness proxies in evolutionary studies and suggest that interpreting social trait variation in terms of strategies like cheating or cooperating may be misleading unless these behaviors are considered in the context of the true multidimensional nature of fitness. D. discoideum “cheater” genotypes produce smaller spores with reduced viability D. discoideum “losers” invest in larger spores with higher viability A number/viability trade-off means different social strategies have similar fitness Cheating may be illusory unless viewed in the context of multidimensional fitness If exploitation of social partners increases fitness, then selection should favor one optimal winning strategy. However, cheaters and losers often coexist. Here, Wolf et al. show that different social strategies can coexist in the social amoeba D. discoideum due to trade-offs between social traits, meaning that simple views of cheating may be illusory.
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影响因子：
9.2
作者：
Buttery, Neil J.;Rozen, Daniel E.;Thompson, Christopher R. L.
通讯作者：
Thompson, Christopher R. L.
DOI：
10.1016/j.cub.2009.08.061
发表时间：
2009-11-03
期刊：
Current biology : CB
影响因子：
--
作者：
Vos M;Velicer GJ
通讯作者：
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影响因子：
9.8
作者：
MacLean, R. Craig;Fuentes-Hernandez, Ayari;Gudelj, Ivana
通讯作者：
Gudelj, Ivana
影响因子：
2.1
作者：
Buttery, N. J.;Thompson, C. R. L.;Wolf, J. B.
通讯作者：
Wolf, J. B.
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0702723104
发表时间：
2007-05-22
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Gilbert, Owen M.;Foster, Kevin R.;Queller, David C.
通讯作者：
Queller, David C.