Collaborative Research in Corporatism, Pluralism and Market Competition

近年来，西欧的广泛研究集中在 集体主义的劳资关系体系， 谈判集中在全国范围内， 代表工人和雇主的问题经常得到咨询， 政策举措。 到目前为止，有大量文献详细介绍了 社团主义安排对各种社会和 经济成果。 社团主义制度的国家几乎没有经验 工业冲突以及名义和真实的工资增长缓慢。 社团主义经常被认为是成功的先决条件， 收入政策。 真实的工资适度反过来导致上级 经济业绩（失业率降低， 增长）。 与此同时，社团主义与 福利支出增长较快，导致许多学者 在社团主义中看到一种政治交易， 广泛的福利计划，以换取私人工资的适度 谈判 这种关于经验模式的广泛共识并没有延伸， 然而，从理论上理解。 三个问题特别 有争议或不清楚：1）社团主义者之间的关系 结构和工会政治，2）结构的影响， 政府经济政策效果的利益代表， （三）社团主义的安排对谁有利，对谁不利。 关于第一个问题，一种观点认为，社团主义是强加于 工人违背自己的意愿。 一种观点认为社团主义是 代表着工会运动的成功拉拢， 资本主义社会秩序的需要。 另一种观点 社团主义是劳工之间非民主勾结的结果， 雇主和政府。 根据反对派的观点，社团主义者 这些安排得到工会领导人的支持，因为他们的成员 效益 关于第二个问题，人们对以下方面的影响知之甚少： 在需求管理以外的经济政策上的社团主义， 收入政策。 然而，我们有充分的理由认为， 社团主义和多元主义制度之间的显著差异， 他们对各种其他经济政策的反应，特别是 有关投资和增长的政策。 第三个问题可能是最有争议的， 谁从社团主义安排中获益谁受损的问题。 存在四种可能性：工人获利，雇主亏损，雇主 得与失，双得，双失。 所有四个职位都有 在学术辩论中找到了支持者。 这项研究的目的是发展一个正式的理论， 与多元化和市场竞争相比，合作主义。 等 一个理论将详细说明集中式和 分散的讨价还价，解释实证研究结果，提供 关于增长政策效果的初步回答 在不同的体制环境中进行投资，并澄清 对群体和个人的有利或不利。 在 此外，调查人员将产生一些不同的 如果理论为真，则必然为真的结果，从而表明 未来实证研究的新方向。

In recent years extensive research in Western Europe has focused on corporatist systems of industrial relations in which collective bargaining is centralized on a national scale and organizations representing workers and employers are routinely consulted on major policy initiatives. There is by now a large literature detailing the impact of corporatist arrangements on a wide variety of social and economic outcomes. Nations with corporatist systems experience little industrial conflict and slow growth of nominal and real wages. Corporatism is frequently claimed to be a prerequisite for success with income policies. Real wage moderation leads, in turn, to superior economic performance (lower levels of unemployment and more rapid growth). At the same time, corporatism is associated with a relatively rapid growth of welfare expenditures, leading many scholars to see in corporatism a political bargain whereby unions receive extensive welfare programs in exchange for moderation in private wage negotiations. This widespread consensus about the empirical pattern does not extend, however, to a theoretical understanding. Three issues are particularly controversial or unclear: 1) the relationship between corporatist structures and union politics, 2) the impact of the structure of interest representation on the effects of government economic policy, and 3) who benefits and who loses from corporatist arrangements. On the first issue, one view holds that corporatism was imposed on workers against their will. One variant sees corporatism as representing the successful cooptation of the union movement to serve the needs of the capitalistic social order. Another variant views corporatism as the result of non-democratic collusion between labor, employers, and government. According to the opposing view, corporatist arrangements are supported by union leaders because their members benefit. With regard to the second issue, little is known about the impact of corporatism on economic policy other than demand management and incomes policies. Yet there is good reason to think there are significant differences between corporatist and pluralist systems in their responses to a variety of other economic policies, especially policies concerning investment and growth. The third issue is perhaps the most contentious in terms of resolving the question of who gains and who loses from corporatist arrangements. Four possibilities exist: workers gain and employers lose, employers gain and workers lose, both gain, both lose. All four positions have found advocates in the scholarly debate. The goal of this investigation is to develop a formal theory of corporatism, as compared with pluralism and market competition. Such a theory would specify the critical difference between centralized and decentralized bargaining, explain the empirical findings, provide tentative answers regarding the effects of policies concerning growth and investment in different institutional environments, and clarify the advantages or disadvantages accruing to groups and individuals. In addition, the investigators will generate a number of different consequences that must be true if the theory is true, thus suggesting new directions for future empirical research.