Collaborative Research in Corporatism, Pluralism and Market Competition

近年来，西欧的广泛研究集中在劳资关系的社团主义制度上，在这种制度下，集体谈判集中在全国范围内，代表工人和雇主的组织经常就重大政策倡议征求意见。到目前为止，有大量文献详细描述了社团主义安排对各种社会和经济结果的影响。拥有社团主义制度的国家几乎没有工业冲突，名义和实际工资增长缓慢。社团主义经常被认为是收入政策成功的先决条件。实际工资的放缓反过来又会带来更好的经济表现（更低的失业率和更快的增长）。与此同时，社团主义与福利支出的相对快速增长有关，导致许多学者将社团主义视为一种政治交易，即工会获得广泛的福利计划，以换取私人工资谈判的缓和。然而，这种关于经验模式的广泛共识并没有延伸到理论理解。有三个问题特别有争议或不明确：1)社团主义结构与工会政治之间的关系，2)利益代表结构对政府经济政策效果的影响，以及3)谁从社团主义安排中受益，谁又从社团主义安排中损失。在第一个问题上，一种观点认为社团主义是违背工人的意愿强加给他们的。一种变体认为社团主义代表了工会运动的成功合作，以服务于资本主义社会秩序的需要。另一种变体认为社团主义是劳工、雇主和政府之间非民主勾结的结果。相反的观点认为，社团主义的安排得到工会领导人的支持，因为他们的成员受益。关于第二个问题，除了需求管理和收入政策之外，人们对社团主义对经济政策的影响知之甚少。然而，我们有充分的理由认为，社团主义制度和多元主义制度对各种其他经济政策的反应存在显著差异，尤其是与投资和增长有关的政策。第三个问题可能是最有争议的，就解决社团主义安排中谁得谁输的问题而言。存在四种可能性：工人获利而雇主亏损，雇主获利而工人亏损，双方都获利，双方都亏损。这四种立场都在学术辩论中找到了拥护者。本研究的目的是发展社团主义的正式理论，与多元主义和市场竞争相比较。这种理论将具体说明集中式和分散式讨价还价之间的关键区别，解释实证研究结果，提供关于不同制度环境中有关增长和投资的政策影响的初步答案，并澄清对群体和个人产生的优势或劣势。此外，如果理论是正确的，研究者将产生许多不同的结果，这些结果必须是正确的，从而为未来的实证研究提出了新的方向。

In recent years extensive research in Western Europe has focused on corporatist systems of industrial relations in which collective bargaining is centralized on a national scale and organizations representing workers and employers are routinely consulted on major policy initiatives. There is by now a large literature detailing the impact of corporatist arrangements on a wide variety of social and economic outcomes. Nations with corporatist systems experience little industrial conflict and slow growth of nominal and real wages. Corporatism is frequently claimed to be a prerequisite for success with income policies. Real wage moderation leads, in turn, to superior economic performance (lower levels of unemployment and more rapid growth). At the same time, corporatism is associated with a relatively rapid growth of welfare expenditures, leading many scholars to see in corporatism a political bargain whereby unions receive extensive welfare programs in exchange for moderation in private wage negotiations. This widespread consensus about the empirical pattern does not extend, however, to a theoretical understanding. Three issues are particularly controversial or unclear: 1) the relationship between corporatist structures and union politics, 2) the impact of the structure of interest representation on the effects of government economic policy, and 3) who benefits and who loses from corporatist arrangements. On the first issue, one view holds that corporatism was imposed on workers against their will. One variant sees corporatism as representing the successful cooptation of the union movement to serve the needs of the capitalistic social order. Another variant views corporatism as the result of non-democratic collusion between labor, employers, and government. According to the opposing view, corporatist arrangements are supported by union leaders because their members benefit. With regard to the second issue, little is known about the impact of corporatism on economic policy other than demand management and incomes policies. Yet there is good reason to think there are significant differences between corporatist and pluralist systems in their responses to a variety of other economic policies, especially policies concerning investment and growth. The third issue is perhaps the most contentious in terms of resolving the question of who gains and who loses from corporatist arrangements. Four possibilities exist: workers gain and employers lose, employers gain and workers lose, both gain, both lose. All four positions have found advocates in the scholarly debate. The goal of this investigation is to develop a formal theory of corporatism, as compared with pluralism and market competition. Such a theory would specify the critical difference between centralized and decentralized bargaining, explain the empirical findings, provide tentative answers regarding the effects of policies concerning growth and investment in different institutional environments, and clarify the advantages or disadvantages accruing to groups and individuals. In addition, the investigators will generate a number of different consequences that must be true if the theory is true, thus suggesting new directions for future empirical research.