Collaborative Research in Corporatism, Pluralism and Market Competition

近年来，西欧的广泛研究侧重于公司主义的劳资关系制度，在这种制度下，集体谈判在全国范围内集中进行，代表工人和雇主的组织经常就重大政策倡议进行协商。到目前为止，已经有大量文献详细描述了社团安排对各种社会和经济结果的影响。实行社团主义制度的国家很少发生劳资冲突，名义和实际工资增长缓慢。社团主义经常被认为是收入政策取得成功的先决条件。实际工资的适度反过来又会带来更好的经济表现(更低的失业率和更快的增长)。与此同时，社团主义与福利支出的相对快速增长有关，这导致许多学者在社团主义中看到了一种政治交易，即工会获得广泛的福利计划，以换取在私人工资谈判中的温和。然而，这种关于经验模式的广泛共识并没有扩展到理论上的理解。有三个问题特别有争议或不清楚：1)社团主义结构与工会政治之间的关系，2)利益代表结构对政府经济政策效果的影响，3)谁从社团主义安排中受益，谁从社团主义安排中蒙受损失。关于第一个问题，一种观点认为，社团主义是违背工人意愿强加给他们的。一种变种认为，社团主义代表着工会运动的成功拉拢，以服务于资本主义社会秩序的需要。另一种观点认为，社团主义是劳工、雇主和政府之间非民主勾结的结果。根据反对的观点，社团主义安排得到工会领导人的支持，因为他们的成员受益。关于第二个问题，除了需求管理和收入政策外，人们对企业主义对经济政策的影响知之甚少。然而，我们有充分的理由认为，在应对各种其他经济政策，尤其是有关投资和增长的政策方面，社团主义和多元化体系之间存在显著差异。就解决谁从社团主义安排中获益、谁从社团主义安排中受损的问题而言，第三个问题可能是最具争议性的。有四种可能性：工人获益，雇主吃亏，雇主获利，工人吃亏，两者皆得，皆失。这四种立场都在学术辩论中找到了倡导者。这项调查的目的是发展一种与多元化和市场竞争相比较的公司主义的正式理论。这种理论将明确集中式和分散式讨价还价之间的关键区别，解释经验发现，就不同制度环境下有关增长和投资的政策的影响提供试探性答案，并澄清集体和个人的优势或劣势。此外，如果理论为真，研究人员将产生许多不同的结果，这些结果肯定是正确的，从而为未来的实证研究提出了新的方向。

In recent years extensive research in Western Europe has focused on corporatist systems of industrial relations in which collective bargaining is centralized on a national scale and organizations representing workers and employers are routinely consulted on major policy initiatives. There is by now a large literature detailing the impact of corporatist arrangements on a wide variety of social and economic outcomes. Nations with corporatist systems experience little industrial conflict and slow growth of nominal and real wages. Corporatism is frequently claimed to be a prerequisite for success with income policies. Real wage moderation leads, in turn, to superior economic performance (lower levels of unemployment and more rapid growth). At the same time, corporatism is associated with a relatively rapid growth of welfare expenditures, leading many scholars to see in corporatism a political bargain whereby unions receive extensive welfare programs in exchange for moderation in private wage negotiations. This widespread consensus about the empirical pattern does not extend, however, to a theoretical understanding. Three issues are particularly controversial or unclear: 1) the relationship between corporatist structures and union politics, 2) the impact of the structure of interest representation on the effects of government economic policy, and 3) who benefits and who loses from corporatist arrangements. On the first issue, one view holds that corporatism was imposed on workers against their will. One variant sees corporatism as representing the successful cooptation of the union movement to serve the needs of the capitalistic social order. Another variant views corporatism as the result of non-democratic collusion between labor, employers, and government. According to the opposing view, corporatist arrangements are supported by union leaders because their members benefit. With regard to the second issue, little is known about the impact of corporatism on economic policy other than demand management and incomes policies. Yet there is good reason to think there are significant differences between corporatist and pluralist systems in their responses to a variety of other economic policies, especially policies concerning investment and growth. The third issue is perhaps the most contentious in terms of resolving the question of who gains and who loses from corporatist arrangements. Four possibilities exist: workers gain and employers lose, employers gain and workers lose, both gain, both lose. All four positions have found advocates in the scholarly debate. The goal of this investigation is to develop a formal theory of corporatism, as compared with pluralism and market competition. Such a theory would specify the critical difference between centralized and decentralized bargaining, explain the empirical findings, provide tentative answers regarding the effects of policies concerning growth and investment in different institutional environments, and clarify the advantages or disadvantages accruing to groups and individuals. In addition, the investigators will generate a number of different consequences that must be true if the theory is true, thus suggesting new directions for future empirical research.