Political Institutions, Government Spending and Economic Growth

小行星9507648 本研究调查1）政治制度-定义为民主，专制和官僚-是否影响政府的总经济规模，以及2）政府规模是否对经济表现产生影响，以增长，消费，投资，通货膨胀和人口动态为衡量标准。 不同类型的民主制度的影响，主要是总统制和总统制，也区分 重点放在政府的目标和问责机制，他们在不同的政治体制下面临的。 关于政府规模和经济绩效的经验预测来自正式模型。 这些预测进行了测试，使用139个国家的数据在1950年和1990年之间，估计的概率，在职者失去办公室，由于经济表现不佳，并估计方程，政府规模与经济表现。 对每一种类型的政治体制分别进行分析，同时考虑到体制在经济绩效方面是内生的。 该项目将阐明政治制度对政府问责制及其经济行为的影响。 特别是，它将评估是否可以预期民主比不同类型的独裁产生更好的经济政策和更好的业绩，以及不同的民主机构是否影响政策和业绩。 这些结果对制度工程问题有直接影响，特别适用于新的民主国家。 ***

9507648 Przeworksi This research investigation examines 1) whether political regimes--defined as democracy, autocracy, and bureaucracy--affect the aggregate economic size of governments, and 2) whether government size has consequences for economic performance, measured in terms of growth, consumption, investment, inflation, and population dynamics. The impact of different types of democratic institutions, mainly parliamentarism and presidentialism, is also distinguished The emphasis is placed on the objectives of governments and the mechanisms of accountability they face under different political institutions. Empirical predictions concerning the size of government and economic performance are derived from a formal model. These predictions are tested, using data for 139 countries between 1950 and 1990, by estimating the probability that incumbents lose office as a result of bad economic performance and by estimating equations which relate government size to economic performance. The analysis is conducted separately for each type of political institution, taking account of the fact that regimes are endogenous with regard to economic performance. The project will elucidate the impact of political institutions on the accountability of governments and on their economic behavior. In particular, it will assess whether democracy can be expected to generate better economic policies and better performance than different types of dictatorship and whether different democratic institutions affect policies and performance. These results have direct consequences for issues of institutional engineering, particularly applicable to new democracies. ***