Union Power, Partisan Control and Economic Performance of OCED Countries, 1960-1985

经合组织国家最近的一些经济表现研究报告称，那些拥有强大工会和社会民主政府的国家，以及那些拥有软弱工会和右翼政府的国家，在增长、投资和失业方面都比政治模式更加复杂的国家做得更好。这项研究尚不清楚的是，为什么会出现这种情况：是因为意识形态取向不同的政府在工会强大和虚弱的情况下选择了不同的政策，还是因为相同的政策在工会强大时会产生不同的后果？这项调查的重点是财政政策，特别是不同类型的税收政策。经济理论导致人们相信，投资可以通过保持较高的税后利润水平或通过对资本收入征收对投资影响中性的税收来筹集资金。考虑到这一替代选择，人们预计，意识形态取向不同的政府将使用不同的税收政策。特别是，社会民主政府将对资本收入征收投资中性税，并发展广泛的福利服务。然而，税收的效果取决于工会的力量。当工会强大时，他们可以根据税收和转移支付调整工资率，在对就业网络收入征税时增加他们的要求，并减少他们喜欢的私人工资，以应对转移支付和福利服务。实力较弱的工会很少能做到同样的事情。将为这项研究收集一个数据库，其中包括1960年至今经合组织国家的政治和经济数据。然后，调查人员分析这些数据，以评估工会的哪些方面在影响投资、工会工资、工会与非工会工资差异以及私人和公共就业方面确实起到了重要作用。这位调查者将调查不同取向的政府面对不同力量的工会时，是否真的选择了不同的财政政策。还将评估这些政策对投资、经济增长、工资、转移和福利服务以及收入不平等的影响。这项研究的贡献将是双重的。首先，该项目应该阐明政府政策的前因后果。因此，对经济表现的研究往往从政治条件跳到经济结果，把整个政策过程留在一个黑匣子里。这项研究的目的是确定为什么政府选择不同的政策，以及鉴于工会的权力，相同的政策是否会产生不同的后果。其次，研究应该找出工会的重要之处：他们从什么那里获得针对雇主和政府采取战略性行动的力量。更广泛地说，这项调查应该有助于更现实地理解经济是一个在制度框架内行动的政府、公司和工会之间的战略互动系统。

A number of recent studies of economic performance among the OECD countries report that those countries which have strong unions and social-democratic governments and those countries which have weak unions and right-wing governments both do better in terms of growth, investment and unemployment than countries in which the political patterns are more mixed. What is not clear from this research is why this would be the case: is it because governments with different ideological orientations choose different policies in the presence of strong and weak unions or is it because the same policies have different consequences when unions are strong than when they are weak? This investigation focuses on fiscal policies, in particular, on different kinds of tax policies. Economic theory leads to the belief that investment can be financed by maintaining a high level of after- tax profits or by using taxes on income from capital that are neutral in their effect on investment. Given this alternative, one would expect that governments with different ideological orientations would use different tax policies. In particular, that social-democratic governments would impose investment-neutral taxes on incomes from capital and develop extensive welfare services. The effect of taxes, however, depends on the power of unions. When unions are strong, they can adjust wage rates in response to taxes and transfers, increasing their demands when incomes from employmnet are taxed and decreasing their preferred private wage in response to transfers and welfare services. Weak unions can rarely do the same. A database comprised of political and economic data on OECD countries from 1960 to the present will be gathered for this research. The investigator then analyzes these data to assess which of the aspects of unions do in fact matter in influencing investment, union wages, union vs. non-union wage differentials, as well as private and public employment. The investigator will examine whether governments with different orientations, facing unions with different strength, do in fact choose different fiscal policies. The effects of these policies on investment, economic growth, wages, transfers and welfare services, and income inequality will also be evaluated. The contribution of this research will be twofold. First, the project should illuminate the causes and consequences of government policies. Studies of economic performance have thus tended to jump from political conditions to economic outcomes, leaving the entire policy process in a black box. The purpose of the research is to determine why governments choose different policies and if the same policies have different consequences given the power of unions. Secondly, the research should identify what it is about unions that matters: from what do they derive the strength to act strategically vis-a-vis employers and governments. More generally, this investigation should contribute to a more realistic understanding of the economy as a system of strategic interaction among governments, firms and unions, acting within an institutional framework.