Union Power, Partisan Control and Economic Performance of OCED Countries, 1960-1985

经合组织国家的联盟权力、党派控制和经济表现，1960-1985 年

• 批准号: 8821520
• 负责人: Adam Przeworski
• 金额: $ 5.03万
• 依托单位: University of Chicago
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-02-01 至 1991-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8821520&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Union; Power; Partisan; Control; Economic

A number of recent studies of economic performance among the OECD countries report that those countries which have strong unions and social-democratic governments and those countries which have weak unions and right-wing governments both do better in terms of growth, investment and unemployment than countries in which the political patterns are more mixed. What is not clear from this research is why this would be the case: is it because governments with different ideological orientations choose different policies in the presence of strong and weak unions or is it because the same policies have different consequences when unions are strong than when they are weak? This investigation focuses on fiscal policies, in particular, on different kinds of tax policies. Economic theory leads to the belief that investment can be financed by maintaining a high level of after- tax profits or by using taxes on income from capital that are neutral in their effect on investment. Given this alternative, one would expect that governments with different ideological orientations would use different tax policies. In particular, that social-democratic governments would impose investment-neutral taxes on incomes from capital and develop extensive welfare services. The effect of taxes, however, depends on the power of unions. When unions are strong, they can adjust wage rates in response to taxes and transfers, increasing their demands when incomes from employmnet are taxed and decreasing their preferred private wage in response to transfers and welfare services. Weak unions can rarely do the same. A database comprised of political and economic data on OECD countries from 1960 to the present will be gathered for this research. The investigator then analyzes these data to assess which of the aspects of unions do in fact matter in influencing investment, union wages, union vs. non-union wage differentials, as well as private and public employment. The investigator will examine whether governments with different orientations, facing unions with different strength, do in fact choose different fiscal policies. The effects of these policies on investment, economic growth, wages, transfers and welfare services, and income inequality will also be evaluated. The contribution of this research will be twofold. First, the project should illuminate the causes and consequences of government policies. Studies of economic performance have thus tended to jump from political conditions to economic outcomes, leaving the entire policy process in a black box. The purpose of the research is to determine why governments choose different policies and if the same policies have different consequences given the power of unions. Secondly, the research should identify what it is about unions that matters: from what do they derive the strength to act strategically vis-a-vis employers and governments. More generally, this investigation should contribute to a more realistic understanding of the economy as a system of strategic interaction among governments, firms and unions, acting within an institutional framework.

经合组织最近对经济表现的一些研究表明， 各国报告说，那些拥有强大工会和 社会民主主义政府和那些软弱的国家 工会和右翼政府在增长方面都做得更好， 投资和失业率高于政治 模式更加复杂。 这项研究不清楚的是为什么 这将是这样的情况：这是因为政府与不同的 意识形态取向选择不同的政策， 工会的强弱，还是因为同样的政策 工会强大时的后果与工会弱小时的后果有何不同？ 本研究的重点是财政政策，特别是 不同的税收政策。 经济学理论让我们相信 这种投资可以通过保持高水平的后- 对利润征税或对资本收入征税， 影响投资。 考虑到这一选择， 希望具有不同意识形态取向的政府 使用不同的税收政策。 特别是，社会民主党 政府将对来自美国的收入征收投资中性税， 并发展广泛的福利服务。 税收的影响， 但是，这取决于工会的力量。 当工会强大时， 可以根据税收和转移支付调整工资率， 当就业收入被征税并减少时， 他们对转移支付和福利的偏好 服务 弱小的工会很少能做到这一点。 由经合组织国家的政治和经济数据组成的数据库 从1960年到现在，我们将收集这些数据进行研究。 的 然后，研究人员分析这些数据，以评估 事实上，工会在影响投资、工会工资、工会 与非工会工资差异，以及私营和公共部门的工资差异 就业 调查人员将审查政府是否与 不同的取向，面对不同实力的工会， 选择不同的财政政策。 这些政策的效果 投资、经济增长、工资、转移支付和福利服务， 收入不平等也将得到评估。 这项研究的贡献将是双重的。 一是项目 应该阐明政府政策的原因和后果。 因此，对经济表现的研究往往从政治层面跳出来， 经济结果的条件，离开整个政策过程中， 黑匣子 这项研究的目的是确定为什么政府 选择不同的政策，如果相同的政策有不同的 这是工会权力的后果。 第二，研究应 确定工会的重要性：他们从什么方面 获得与雇主进行战略合作的能力， 政府的 更一般地说，这项调查应有助于 更现实地理解经济作为一个战略体系， 政府、企业和工会之间的互动， 体制框架。