Theories of the Firm

该项目推进了该公司经济理论的前沿。该项目可分为以下五个子部分。首先，该项目继续确定长期激励合同何时可以被一系列更简单的短期合同取代。这一点很重要，因为现代经济组织理论建立在这样一个假设之上，即组织的产生是由于市场契约的不完全性。其次，在现代经济中，连续生产阶段之间的大部分协调都是通过管理进行的，而不是通过价格体系更宽松地安排。该项目分析了非价格沟通在公司内部以及公司与供应商之间所起的作用。第三，该项目发展了一种长期合同理论，作为一种避免与一段又一段时间有效谈判短期合同相关的交易成本的方式。第四，该项目扩大了对寻租行为的调查范围，涵盖了公共和私营部门组织。强调财产权。一个人对理想的工作、房子或有利的办公地点的财产权(除其他功能外)用来限制他人对该财产的权力。这种权利将阻止B人试图夺取A人的财产，并减少A保护财产的需要，为双方留出更多时间进行生产性活动。这一框架被用来探讨“零基预算”制度的失败，在这种制度下，各部门对其预算没有产权，但必须证明每年的每一分钱都是合理的。第五，最后一个话题是在不完全信息下无限重复博弈(“超级博弈”)中的监控。超级博弈被用来分析在公司和市场上频繁出现的不同类型的小规模互动，即信守承诺，如果对方也这样做，就会有所帮助。

The project advances the frontiers of the economic theory of the firm. The project can be divided into the following five sub-parts. First, the project continues to determine just when long-term incentive contracts can be replaced by a series of simpler short-term contracts. This is important because modern economic organization theory rests on the hypothesis that organizations emerge on account of the incompleteness of market contracts. Second, in modern economies, much of the coordination between successive stages of production are managed, rather than arranged more loosely through the price system. The project analyzes the role played by non-price communications within a firm and between a firm and its suppliers. Third, the project develops a theory of long-term contracting as a way of avoiding the transaction costs associated with negotiating efficiently short-term contracts period after period. Fourth, the project expands the investigation of rent seeking to encompass both public and private sector organizations. Property rights are emphasized. A person's property rights to a desirable job, a house, or a favorable office location, serve (among other functions) to limit the authority of others over that property. Such rights will discourage person B from attempting to grab person A's property and reduce A's need to protect the property, leaving more time available for productive activities for both parties. This framework is used to explore the failure of "zero base budgeting" systems, in which departments have no property rights to their budgets but must justify every penny each year. Fifth, the last topic is monitoring in infinitely repeated games ("supergames") with incomplete information. Supergames are used to analyze the different kinds of small scale interactions that arise on a frequent basis in firms and markets, i.e., keeping promises and being helpful if one's partner does the same.