Theories of the Firm

这个项目推进了企业经济理论的前沿。本项目可分为以下五个部分。首先，该项目继续确定长期激励合同何时可以被一系列更简单的短期合同所取代。这一点很重要，因为现代经济组织理论建立在这样一个假设之上，即组织的出现是由于市场契约的不完全性。其次，在现代经济中，连续生产阶段之间的大部分协调都是有管理的，而不是通过价格体系更松散地安排。该项目分析了公司内部和公司与供应商之间的非价格沟通所起的作用。第三，该项目发展了一种长期合同理论，作为一种避免与一段又一段时间的有效短期合同谈判相关的交易成本的方法。第四，该项目扩大了对寻租的调查，包括公共和私营部门组织。强调产权。一个人对理想的工作、房子或有利的办公地点的财产权（除其他功能外）用于限制他人对该财产的权力。这样的权利将阻止B试图抢夺A的财产，并减少A保护财产的需要，为双方留出更多的时间进行生产性活动。这个框架被用来探讨“零基础预算”制度的失败，在这种制度下，各部门对自己的预算没有产权，但必须证明每年的每一分钱都是合理的。第五，最后一个主题是信息不完全的无限重复博弈（“超级博弈”）中的监控。超级游戏用于分析在公司和市场中频繁出现的不同类型的小规模互动，例如，如果一个人的合作伙伴也这样做，那么他就会遵守承诺并提供帮助。

The project advances the frontiers of the economic theory of the firm. The project can be divided into the following five sub-parts. First, the project continues to determine just when long-term incentive contracts can be replaced by a series of simpler short-term contracts. This is important because modern economic organization theory rests on the hypothesis that organizations emerge on account of the incompleteness of market contracts. Second, in modern economies, much of the coordination between successive stages of production are managed, rather than arranged more loosely through the price system. The project analyzes the role played by non-price communications within a firm and between a firm and its suppliers. Third, the project develops a theory of long-term contracting as a way of avoiding the transaction costs associated with negotiating efficiently short-term contracts period after period. Fourth, the project expands the investigation of rent seeking to encompass both public and private sector organizations. Property rights are emphasized. A person's property rights to a desirable job, a house, or a favorable office location, serve (among other functions) to limit the authority of others over that property. Such rights will discourage person B from attempting to grab person A's property and reduce A's need to protect the property, leaving more time available for productive activities for both parties. This framework is used to explore the failure of "zero base budgeting" systems, in which departments have no property rights to their budgets but must justify every penny each year. Fifth, the last topic is monitoring in infinitely repeated games ("supergames") with incomplete information. Supergames are used to analyze the different kinds of small scale interactions that arise on a frequent basis in firms and markets, i.e., keeping promises and being helpful if one's partner does the same.