Theories of the Firm

该项目推进了经济理论的前沿， the firm. 该项目可分为以下五个 子部分。 首先，该项目继续确定何时 长期激励合同可以由一系列 简单的短期合同。 这一点很重要，因为现代 经济组织理论基于这样一个假设， 市场的不完全性导致了组织的产生 合同. 其次，在现代经济中， 生产的各个阶段之间进行管理，而不是 通过价格体系更宽松地安排。 项目 分析了非价格沟通在一个 公司与供应商之间的关系。 三是项目 发展了一种长期合同理论， 与有效谈判相关的交易成本 短期合同一个接一个。 第四，项目将寻租调查扩大到 包括公共和私营部门组织。 财产 权利得到强调。 一个人的财产权，以一个可取的 一份工作、一所房子或一个有利的办公地点，服务于（除其他外 （3）限制他人对该财产的权力。 这些权利将阻止B试图抢夺 A的财产并减少A保护财产的需要， 使双方有更多的时间从事生产活动， parties. 这个框架是用来探讨失败的“零” 基本预算”制度，其中各部门没有财产 他们有权获得预算，但每年必须证明每一分钱的合理性。 第五，最后一个话题是无限重复博弈中的监控 （“超级博弈”）的不完全信息。 超级游戏被用来 来分析不同种类的小规模相互作用， 在企业和市场中频繁出现，即，保持 承诺和帮助，如果一个人的伴侣也这样做。

The project advances the frontiers of the economic theory of the firm. The project can be divided into the following five sub-parts. First, the project continues to determine just when long-term incentive contracts can be replaced by a series of simpler short-term contracts. This is important because modern economic organization theory rests on the hypothesis that organizations emerge on account of the incompleteness of market contracts. Second, in modern economies, much of the coordination between successive stages of production are managed, rather than arranged more loosely through the price system. The project analyzes the role played by non-price communications within a firm and between a firm and its suppliers. Third, the project develops a theory of long-term contracting as a way of avoiding the transaction costs associated with negotiating efficiently short-term contracts period after period. Fourth, the project expands the investigation of rent seeking to encompass both public and private sector organizations. Property rights are emphasized. A person's property rights to a desirable job, a house, or a favorable office location, serve (among other functions) to limit the authority of others over that property. Such rights will discourage person B from attempting to grab person A's property and reduce A's need to protect the property, leaving more time available for productive activities for both parties. This framework is used to explore the failure of "zero base budgeting" systems, in which departments have no property rights to their budgets but must justify every penny each year. Fifth, the last topic is monitoring in infinitely repeated games ("supergames") with incomplete information. Supergames are used to analyze the different kinds of small scale interactions that arise on a frequent basis in firms and markets, i.e., keeping promises and being helpful if one's partner does the same.