Cumulative Offer Processes

累积报价流程

• 批准号: 0239910
• 负责人: Paul Milgrom
• 金额: $ 23.69万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-03-01 至 2007-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0239910&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Cumulative; Offer; Processes

In the past decade, several procedures devised by economic theorists have been employed for high value resource allocation problems. These include auctions for radio spectrum in many countries, electrical power sales, and carbon emissions reductions in the UK, as well as matching processes for physicians and psychologists. Most of the new processes are "cumulative offer processes:" multi-round processes in which offers either remain on the table or could remain on the table without affecting the outcome of the mechanism. Recent proposals to conduct "package auctions" (also known as "combinatorial auctions") for radio spectrum in the US and UK and to use auctions for train scheduling have met with success in laboratory experiments using other cumulative offer processes. The research proposed here is a detailed exploration of the theory of cumulative offer processes. I anticipate obtaining several kinds of results. These will include (1) a complete characterization of the market situations in which cumulative offer processes can guarantee stable ("core") allocations, (2) an extended analysis of the welfare properties of the processes, answering questions about who benefits most from which design, (3) the development of new algorithms that succeed with high probability for matching markets like the market for new medical residents, in which we know that no algorithm can always guarantee a stable outcome, (4) a unification of the theories of matching markets and auction markets, and (5) a game theoretic analysis of auction and matching processes when the participants have poor information about one another's values

在过去的十年中，经济理论家设计的几种程序已被用于解决高价值资源配置问题。其中包括许多国家的无线电频谱拍卖、英国的电力销售和碳减排，以及医生和心理学家的匹配流程。大多数新流程都是“累积报价流程”：多轮流程，其中报价要么保留在桌面上，要么可以保留在桌面上而不影响机制的结果。最近提出的在美国和英国对无线电频谱进行“打包拍卖”（也称为“组合拍卖”）以及使用拍卖进行列车调度的提议已在使用其他累积报价流程的实验室实验中取得了成功。这里提出的研究是对累积报价过程理论的详细探索。我预计会获得几种结果。这些将包括（1）对市场情况的完整描述，其中累积报价流程可以保证稳定（“核心”）分配，（2）对流程的福利属性进行扩展分析，回答有关谁从哪种设计中受益最大的问题，（3）开发新算法，以高概率成功匹配市场，例如新的医疗居民市场，我们知道没有算法可以始终保证稳定的分配 结果，（4）匹配市场和拍卖市场理论的统一，以及（5）当参与者对彼此的价值观缺乏了解时，对拍卖和匹配过程进行博弈论分析