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Cumulative Offer Processes

Cumulative Offer Processes
累积报价流程
批准号:
0239910
负责人:
Paul Milgrom
金额:
$23.69万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2003
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2003-03-01 至 2007-02-28

项目摘要

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中文摘要
翻译
在过去的十年里,经济理论家设计的几个程序已被用于高价值资源配置问题。这些包括许多国家的无线电频谱拍卖,英国的电力销售和碳排放减少,以及医生和心理学家的匹配过程。大多数新进程是“累积提议进程“:多轮进程,其中提议要么留在桌面上,要么可以留在桌面上,而不影响机制的结果。最近的建议,进行“包拍卖”(也称为“组合拍卖”)的无线电频谱在美国和英国,并使用拍卖的列车调度已成功地在实验室实验中使用其他累积报价过程。本文的研究是对累积报价过程理论的一次详细探索。我期望得到几种结果。这些将包括(1)累积报价过程可以保证稳定(“核心”)分配的市场情况的完整表征,(2)对过程的福利属性的扩展分析,回答关于谁从哪种设计中受益最多的问题,(3)开发新算法,以高概率成功匹配市场,如新的医疗居民市场,其中我们知道,没有任何算法能够始终保证一个稳定的结果,(4)匹配市场和拍卖市场理论的统一,(5)当参与者对彼此的价值缺乏信息时,拍卖和匹配过程的博弈论分析
英文摘要
In the past decade, several procedures devised by economic theorists have been employed for high value resource allocation problems. These include auctions for radio spectrum in many countries, electrical power sales, and carbon emissions reductions in the UK, as well as matching processes for physicians and psychologists. Most of the new processes are "cumulative offer processes:" multi-round processes in which offers either remain on the table or could remain on the table without affecting the outcome of the mechanism. Recent proposals to conduct "package auctions" (also known as "combinatorial auctions") for radio spectrum in the US and UK and to use auctions for train scheduling have met with success in laboratory experiments using other cumulative offer processes. The research proposed here is a detailed exploration of the theory of cumulative offer processes. I anticipate obtaining several kinds of results. These will include (1) a complete characterization of the market situations in which cumulative offer processes can guarantee stable ("core") allocations, (2) an extended analysis of the welfare properties of the processes, answering questions about who benefits most from which design, (3) the development of new algorithms that succeed with high probability for matching markets like the market for new medical residents, in which we know that no algorithm can always guarantee a stable outcome, (4) a unification of the theories of matching markets and auction markets, and (5) a game theoretic analysis of auction and matching processes when the participants have poor information about one another's values
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Auction Design for Complex Centralized Markets
  • 批准号:
    1947514
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $27.7万
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 负责人:
    Paul Milgrom
  • 依托单位:
Auction Market Design
  • 批准号:
    1525730
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $24.2万
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 负责人:
    Paul Milgrom
  • 依托单位:
SBIR Phase I: Incorporating Bidder Budgets in Multi-Item Auctions
  • 批准号:
    0946124
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 负责人:
    Paul Milgrom
  • 依托单位:
Market Design
  • 批准号:
    0648293
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $14.1万
  • 财政年份:
    2007
  • 负责人:
    Paul Milgrom
  • 依托单位:
海外基金